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THE UNIVERSE WORKS ON A MATH EQUATION THAT NEVER EVEN EVER REALLY 
EVEN ENDS IN THE END: CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE’S EVOLUTIONARY 
METAPHYSICS AND THE LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS 
 
 
Recent work on Charles Sanders Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology and scientific metaphysics 
has revealed a  tension between two accounts Peirce gives of the laws of nature. Andrew Reynolds 
points out that Peirce seems to have thought that the laws evolved both in a statistical way—
according to which the laws themselves are the statistical result of the Law of Large Numbers 
applied to instances of the laws—and also in a more directly evolutionary way, according to which 
instances of the laws reinforce one another making future instances conform to past ones. By 
forming “habits”. These two analyses are straightforwardly incompatible, since the Law of Large 
Numbers requires events in the series to which the statistical analysis applies to be independent from 
one another, whereas the other account explicitly involves future law instantiations depending on 
past ones. Reynolds calls this problem the Incompatibility Problem. Despite the apparent 
contradiction, the work of this paper attempts a rational reconstruction of Peirce’s evolutionary 
metaphysics, and on this reinterpretation of Peirce’s cosmology, the incompatibility problem does 
not arise. On this view, the laws of nature remain statistical results of chance property instantiations, 
including dispositional property instantiations. It is argued, however, that Peirce need not be 
committed to the idea that instantiations of laws are dependent on one another. Rather, the view 
according to which habits in nature are formed is argued to apply to properties of the universe as a 
whole, thereby explaining why the universe contains any regularities at all. The so called “law of 
habit” is shown to be a special case of the Law of Large Numbers as applied to the world’s 
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Introduction 
 
Not all works of philosophy proceed in the same way. It would be nice if every great 
philosopher fashioned her thought linearly, so that one could easily trace the course of her 
argumentation over time, noting here and there where her thoughts on a matter diverged from their 
previous path. No human writer has ever produced such niceties as far as I am aware, or at least no 
very good writer. But there is a spectrum of organization of thought, and some writers fall far 
enough to one side to approximate the ideal to some degree.  
 
Charles Sanders Peirce was, sadly, no such writer. His thought hangs together much like a 
magnificent painting or architectural structure or, perhaps, a fugue. The parts are easier understood 
once the whole has been taken in. This is not to say we cannot study Peirce’s thought piecemeal to 
some extent. Historians of philosophy have been doing just that for around a century. It is, rather, to 
say that a systematic exegesis of Peirce’s writing is notably difficult. To understand the significance of 
one aspect of his thought, the reader sometimes needs to have an idea of five or six other topics 
Peirce takes for granted. He even goes to say at some points how his reader will not understand a 
current paper/lecture unless she is familiar with other lectures he has given or papers he has written 
(and sometimes one’s he has not!).  
 
This essay is about Peirce’s account of the laws of nature. It is possible to give the reader a 
thorough account of the assumed background knowledge requisite for seeing in one glance how the 
picture fits together, but to do so in a technical way would, I think, tire the reader and would be 
better explicated differently.  
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For this reason, I have chosen to introduce the first chapter by way of an old but familiar 
rhetorical device: a dialogue. The reader should not be mislead into thinking this choice was made to 
skirt past technicalities or to be lazy. I promise, there will be more than enough technicalities in later 
chapters. The point here is to convey the main idea of the thesis in a natural way without burdening 
the reader. With any luck, the reader will be able to discern fairly quickly the main motivation for 
creating a piece of philosophy such as this, as well as have a general idea of why Peirce thought the 
laws of nature evolved over time.  
 
It is always so much easier to discuss these things with a friend, so the remainder of this 
introduction starts with my old roommate, Kylan, at my favorite bar, Social, an underground 
speakeasy in Fort Collins, Colorado.   
 
KYLAN: So, Joshua, now that we’re settled in, I’ve been meaning to ask you about your thesis.  
JOSHUA: Ask away, my friend.  
K: Well, I don’t really know where to begin. What’s it about, I guess? 
J: Well, you already know I’m working on Peirce.  
K: Yes, I remember that. Something about laws of nature and metaphysics. 
J: That’s right. My advisor told me not to write about Peirce’s cosmology, but I spurned his advice 
K: Okay, so what’s the deal? 
J: Well, Peirce has some cool ideas. Like he thinks the laws of nature evolved over time rather than 
starting out in the beginning just as they are now--assuming there even was a beginning.  
K: Weird. Why? 
J: Well, for one thing, he really hated the idea that anything should go unexplained. So the laws of 
nature, since they seem to be obvious candidates for scientific inquiry, should be explainable. We 
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should, in principle, be able to explain why there are any laws at all and also why the laws we 
observe are the laws we observe.  
K: But why would the laws have to evolve? 
J: Well, I suppose he thought if they didn’t then there is no reason they would be the way they are. 
They would be arbitrary.  
K: So explanation was really important to him then-- 
J: Yes, very much so! He was very concerned with making sure everything requiring an explanation 
gets one.  
K: That seems to imply that some things might not require one.  
J: Well, not logically, but yes, he did think chance itself doesn’t require an explanation.  
K: What do you mean? What’s he mean by chance? 
J: That’s a little complicated, but it seems part of the reason he didn’t think chance required an 
explanation is because of the kind of thing it is generally. The definition of chance is that it is such as 
to have no explanation. We could think of events in nature proceeding like an argument. If a chance 
event had an explanation, that would mean there is a kind of argument which would produce the 
event as the conclusion of previous premises. But then it wouldn’t be chance! In that case, the event 
would be quite determined.  
K: Right. So you’re saying chance just wouldn’t be chance if there were explanations for chance 
phenomena? So chance is unexplainable? 
J: It doesn’t require explanation.  
K: Okay...but then why think it’s even a thing?  
J: Good question. Peirce has lots of reasons for this, but the main one is that he thinks the variety of 
nature can’t be explained without chance, because from like causes follow like effects. So he thinks 
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we would never see the emergence of anything organic in a world without chance, or in a world 
governed solely by mechanical causation. 
K: Oh, okay. Basically he’s worried that you can’t explain irreversible processes without chance? 
Like I can break an egg, but I have never seen an egg spontaneously reform. 
J: Yeah, that’s part of it, or it’s at least related. He thinks just the variety of nature all by itself is 
enough to postulate chance, but irreversible phenomena are another kind of evidence for it.  
K: Alright, so chance, according to Peirce, is a basic feature of the world. Can’t the laws of nature 
have come about by chance? 
J: Well, in one sense they do come about by chance. In another sense, they didn’t just emerge the 
way they are fully formed.  
K: Speak more about this. I guess for your part, you don’t have to go into too many details as to 
why he thought they couldn’t have come about fully formed right? 
J: Right, I mean, that’s an interesting question, but I’m more concerned to show, given that he 
thought they must have evolved, how that occured.  
K: So what’s the story? 
J: Peirce makes frequent appeals to mathematics, so we should take a minute to note the difference 
between a formal and a material law. What needs explaining are material laws, laws of nature. Formal 
laws, such as would be found in mathematics or deductive logic don’t require explanation in the 
same sense, because they are, Peirce thinks, simply the conditions of knowledge in general, which 
would hold as long as there were any laws at all.  
K: What’s so special about material laws then? 
J: Well, for one thing, they are contingent. Nobody--or at least almost nobody--thinks that formal laws 
are contingent. But the law of gravity could have been way different and yet all the Newtonian 
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equations would still work out consistently. So why are the values of the physical constants what 
they are? That’s what requires explanation.  
K: So how does it work? 
J: Peirce thinks that we don’t have very much reason to think the constants involved in the laws of 
nature are exact in the first place. He says our science shows them to be exact only to an impressive 
degree of approximation. You might think that just means our instruments are inaccurate, but he 
suggests instead that the laws themselves are not exact and are much more like the statistical 
uniformities guaranteed to arise by the chance interplay of any large number of objects.  
K: You’re talking about the law of large numbers. 
J: Yes, exactly. The law of large numbers helps explain why, for example, there is a tendency for a 
gas to achieve a state of equilibrium. Peirce thinks the laws of nature are all like gas laws. There are 
fluctuations around central mean values for constants. 
K: So all laws are statistical in some sense? 
J: Yeah, all the laws of nature. If that were the case, then they could be explained by the operation of 
chance--which you will remember, requires no explanation--and formal laws... 
K: Which are necessary and presupposed in any rational world, because they are conditions for 
knowledge generally.  
J: Exactly! 
K: Something tells me this isn’t the whole story. 
J: It’s not. The problem is, this isn’t the only account of law evolution Peirce gives. He also gives an 
account involving something called the “law of habit.” So with that he proposes an account that 
looks like he’s saying  that habits or tendencies are formed in nature by occasions of one kind of 
event increasing the likelihood that an event like that will occur again. So then laws of nature are like 
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habits of things that have taken hold over a long time. They start out irregular, but they eventually 
become nearly inevitable in their effects as habits “catch on”.  
K: What’s the problem? Is that at odds with the other account somehow? 
J: Good question. I don’t think it has to be, but it depends on how we read it. Supposedly there is a 
problem, because if the statistical account is right, then the events going into the calculation have to 
be statistically independent of one another. If they are influencing each other’s likelihood of 
occurrence, then they are connected and so not independent afterall. Then, the uniformities that 
result will not be due to the law of large numbers and chance. The problem with that is more 
fundamental than this simple incompatibility, however. The problem is: how can Peirce explain law 
and regularity without assuming the very regularities he has set out to explain? 
K:What do you mean?  
J: Well, even on the statistical account, there have to be some regularities. If we know there are red 
and black marbles in a bag, we can discover through random sampling certain statistical facts about 
the marbles, but if sometimes the marbles change color or even all their other properties so that a 
marble might spontaneously transform into a small bird or something crazy, then the statistical 
account will really be of no use.  
K: Oh, I see. So how do those basic regularities arise, since they are already lawlike? 
J: Exactly. If that can be answered, I think we automatically get an answer to the other problem 
about incompatibility.  
K: Well I can’t wait to read it. 
J: You’ll be the first to know when it’s finished! 
  




Charles Sanders Peirce was a wildly systematic thinker of magnificent intellectual proportion. 
His studies were wide ranging and consumed him for much of his life, during which he made 
significant advances in the fields of logic, philosophy of science, epistemology, semiotics, geodesy, 
mathematics, chemistry, and phenomenology, and he is often regarded among philosophers as one 
of the key founders of the school of American Pragmatism, along with William James. Despite such 
polymathery, the poor fellow died fairly unrecognized in his lifetime, except by the likes of a few 
close friends, such as James. Lesser studied among Peirce’s work is his metaphysics and cosmology, 
which have largely been brushed aside by Peirce scholars, since it is very odd and appears to “[have] 
rather tenuous connections with the rest of the system, offering, apart from scattered flashes of 
insight, views which have a sociological or biographical, rather than a fundamental systematic 
interest”.1 Even Peirce’s contemporaries viewed some of the work with suspicion, with William 
James commenting, circa 1903-1904, that Peirce’s Lowell Lectures on Logic seemed to consist of 
“flashes of brilliant light relieved against Cimmerian darkness”2 
 
I will assume without argument that Peirce was not crazy and that his metaphysics and 
cosmology are interesting and fruitful areas of study. I will also assume that an investigation into 
certain aspects of this nebulous area of his work can be illuminating for present scholars of 
metaphysics and philosophy of science. This is to say that, while I will not defend the usefulness of 
these ideas, I think a sufficiently versed scholar of contemporary metaphysics will find them 
                                                
1
 (CP 6) Editorial Note, Hartshorne and Weiss 
2
 James, p.6. Presumably James had in mind, among others, “The Seven Systems of Metaphysics” (EP2: 
179) in which Peirce makes a defense of his three-category ontology, which plays a large role in his 
cosmology. 
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interesting and useful, for reasons which will be obvious to anyone who works on the metaphysics 
of laws of nature. The project Peirce had going may be somewhat haphazard, and it may well be 
wrong--it is certainly unpopular--but it is worth taking a look at it, because at the very least it 
presents a consistent account of an explanation of one way the laws of nature might be. Or so I will 
argue.  
 
What stands in my way, however, is the fact that Peirce’s account of laws of nature looks 
contradictory. In particular, Andrew Reynolds, a contemporary scholar of Peirce’s metaphysics of 
science, has argued that the account of laws of nature Peirce gives contradicts itself, because the 
conditions Peirce requires to make his cosmology an evolutionary one, where the laws of nature 
emerge over time, relies on two competing explanations involving mutually unsatisfiable constraints. 
Let me first give the elevator pitch version of this problem.  
 
Peirce is convinced that the laws of nature could not have just been laid down at the 
beginning of time as brute, unexplainable facts about the world. They must instead have developed 
or grown over time to be what they are observed to be today. His project is to give an explanatory 
account of how this could happen and why we observe the laws as they are. To do this, he provides 
two analyses. First, he assumes that absolute chance is operative in nature, thereby anticipating some 
of the later interpretations of nature that would come to dominate discussions of quantum 
mechanics in the early Twentieth Century. Moreover, he appeals to statistics as a means of getting 
clear about chance events, and in particular he looks to Bernoulli’s law of large numbers. If the laws 
of nature developed over time, they must be, in some sense, statistical in nature. They will, 
accordingly, obey the Law of Large Numbers.  
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On the other hand, Peirce is also convinced that there are real tendencies operative in nature, 
such that evolution (whether biological or not) proceeds partly by virtue of things acquiring habits of 
behavior over time so that they behave more and more regularly. Peirce thinks he needs this sort of 
explanation to make irreversible processes such as the growth of organic objects understandable. It 
also allows him to attempt bridging the explanatory gap between mind and matter, since the 
development and manifestation of habits in nature, at the level of physical material phenomena, 
mirrors the development of habits of the mind.3 It would be nice if such an explanation were 
forthcoming.  
 
The short of the problem is this. In order to make sense of the laws of nature by appealing 
to the Law of Large Numbers, certain mathematical constraints applicable to the Law of Large 
Numbers have to obtain. For example, the Law of Large Numbers only makes sense if the objects in 
the statistical distribution to which the law applies are independent from one another. In the case of 
a law of nature, this would be like requiring that the occasions on which the law is manifested do not 
influence one another so as to increase the future probability that the law will have a certain value at 
some later manifestation. However, if the laws of nature are also supposed to have come about by 
things in nature taking habits, then it seems the various manifestations of the law are ipso facto 
connected in some way and so highly dependent on one another. Andrew Reynolds calls this 
contradiction the incompatibility problem.  
 
The aim of my project is to take the sting out of the incompatibility problem. Strictly 
speaking, I do not think the incompatibility problem is solvable. If the problem is simply that the 
laws of nature evolve by updating the transition probabilities of event types in the series of 
                                                
3
 I will not address this issue in this essay, though it is interesting. 
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instantiations of the laws, then this kind of evolution is just not compatible with an explanation of 
the laws in terms of the Law of Large Numbers. Maybe there is some other statistical account 
available, but straightforwardly there is a contradiction here.4 My aim is not to solve the problem by 
trying to make the contradiction compatible with itself, nor is it to simply play hardball and commit 
to one horn of the dilemma as the right analysis of laws. I will also not attempt the very audacious 
historical task of trying to figure out exactly what Peirce meant. I hope that the account I will give is 
what he actually meant, but I would be delighted if some historian would come along and prove me 
a dunce. Instead, I provide a rational reconstruction of Peirce’s cosmology and metaphysics of 
evolutionary laws of nature. I will show that underlying the incompatibility problem is a much 
deeper issue, which is a question of how Peirce is to explain the emergence of regularities, such as 
laws of nature, without appealing to those very regularities he has set out to explain in the first place. 
If there is a solution to that, then the incompatibility problem loses its force. If I have succeeded, 
then nothing will be found here which contradicts what Peirce actually wrote, although it may not be 
exactly what he said either. My account is an offering of what Peirce might have responded with if 
charged with the incompatibility problem, and in some sense I argue that this is what he ought to say 
given his other commitments. 
 
The way I will embark upon this project is by first offering an account of the laws of nature 
which I think best fits what Peirce actually says about them. To my knowledge, this task has never 
been done before. Most of  the exegesis on Peirce’s metaphysics and cosmology either provides only 
a cursory overview of the laws of nature according to Peirce, or else it simply eschews it entirely. 
This is understandable given that Peirce himself never provides a worked-out theory of lawhood, or 
                                                
4
 In fact, Reynolds points to the possibility that Peirce had a non-stationary Markov chain in mind as the 
proper statistical analysis of law evolution. The problem with this account is that there is effectively zero 
textual evidence that this is what Peirce had in mind.  
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if he does at all, it’s not very systematic and is scattered throughout his writings on other topics. His 
paper, “Laws of Nature,” for example, is extremely unsatisfactory to read, because while he offers 
some notion of lawhood, it is rather difficult to connect it to what he says in other pieces concerning 
the evolutionary development of laws and nature generally. Besides this, there is the persistent 
equivocation on the term “law” which sometimes is used to refer to an underlying reality 
constituting part of an ontology and sometimes used to refer to the formulation in mathematical 
terms of that underlying reality.  
 
It seems clear to me that Peirce would not want to identify laws with the simple representation 
of them in mathematical terms. Whatever laws are, they are not just formulae. The realist picture of 
metaphysics he espouses will make this fact obvious later. What Peirce seems much more interested 
in, throughout much of his writing on metaphysics, is the nature of “what breathes fire into the 
equations,” as Stephen Hawking has remarked regarding laws of nature.5 Any satisfactory account of 
laws of nature should be able to at least sketch a rough portrait of this fire-breather. Or so Peirce 
and I both think.  
 
I . Reynolds on Peirce ’ s  Cosmology 
 
 Andrew Reynolds calls the inherent tension between Peirce’s conception of the statistical 
mechanical account of chance and the Law of Habit The Incompatibility Problem, which involves an 
apparent contradiction between Peirce’s use of the Law of Large Numbers from statistics as a means 
of analyzing the explanatory power of chance, and his commitment to the thesis of the Law of 
                                                
5
 See Hawking, chapter 12 
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Habit. Reynolds spends a few pages on this problem, after leading up to it for several chapters.6 He 
has also published a separate paper related to the problem called “The Incongruity of Peirce’s 
Tychism”.7 It is not necessary to recount the entirety of the chapters leading up to the problem here, 
but an overview of some of the background will help. The Incompatibility Problem can only be 
understood as a problem after the components of Peirce’s tychism that are allegedly incompatible are 
articulated clearly. These components are the Law of Habit and the “doctrine” of chance. I have 
been deliberately vague in the preceding paragraphs not to mention what is meant by either of these 
notions, especially ‘chance’. Now it is time to take a closer look at what Reynolds means by these 
notions and how he thinks they play a role in generating the Incompatibility Problem.  
 
 Right from the beginning of Peirce’s Scientific Metaphysics, Reynolds makes it clear that on his 
view, much of the important metaphysical work that Peirce was concerned with while developing his 
scientific metaphysics relied on Peirce’s understanding and interpretation of scientific and 
mathematical results that played a prominent role in 19th Century intellectual discourse. Specifically, 
Reynolds points out that the results from statistical thermodynamics and Darwinian evolution 
appear to have  played a significant role in Peirce’s thought throughout his life and especially in his 
later creation of a cosmology. In addition to this scientific streak, Peirce was influenced significantly 
by the German idealists, especially Kant, Hegel, and Schelling. Together, these influences resulted in 
his being fascinated with the idea of a developmental account of nature, an evolutionary cosmology. In 
particular, as Reynolds notes, Peirce wanted a way to explain a variety of phenomena that seem to 
require an explanation but for which such explanations do not seem forthcoming. Among such 
phenomena in need of an explanation are: the growth and complexity of both biological phenomena 
                                                
6
 I do not want to be misleading here. Reynolds’ book is interesting for a number of reasons that are quite 
independent from the Incompatibility Problem. The problem itself does not occur until Chapter 6.  
7
 Reynolds, 1997 
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and, Peirce argues, the universe as a whole; the variety of nature or the extreme differentiation 
between various observable phenomena; the laws of nature, or regularity more generally; and mind, 
including consciousness and “feeling”.8  
 
 Of these phenomena, it is Peirce’s contention that regularity and the laws of nature require 
explanation that most interests me, although it is virtually impossible to figure out what Peirce’s 
views on any particular portion of his cosmology are without delving into all four of the issues 
above to some degree or other. Peirce was a wildly systematic thinker, and his solutions to one area 
borrow liberally from results or developments in the other areas. However, if Reynolds is correct, 
then one of the key scientific results that influenced Peirce’s discussion of this issue (as well as the 
others) was the discovery and development of statistical thermodynamics. Moreover, Peirce sees 
statistical ideas such as the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit Theorem as indispensable 
to his evolutionary cosmology, because it is through these results that he is able to connect the ideas 
of evolutionary development at the level of organism to the cosmological development at the level 
of laws of nature.9  
 
 Lest we lose sight of the fact that, whatever else he is up to, explaining how the laws of 
nature came to be was high on Peirce’s priority of things to explain, it is worth quoting Peirce 
directly. He says, for example, that, “Law is par excellence the thing that wants a reason.”10 And: 
 
Once you have embraced the principle of continuity no kind of explanation 
of things will satisfy you except that [the laws] grew. The infallibilist 
naturally thinks that everything always was substantially as it is now. Laws 
at any rate being absolute could not grow. They either always were, or they 
                                                
8
 Reynolds 2002, 13 and 6.35-65; 6.613 
9
 Reynolds, ibid 
10
 6.12 
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sprang instantaneously into being...This makes the laws of nature 
absolutely blind and inexplicable. Their why and wherefore can’t be asked. 
This absolutely blocks the road of inquiry.11  
 
 Peirce is here concerned that the infallibilist simply accepts the existence of laws of nature as 
unexplained brute facts, thereby making them cut off from rational inquiry. The laws of nature must 
be amenable to reason and inquiry, or else, Peirce thinks, we would have to admit that they are 
arbitrary and unreasonable basic facts of the matter, an admission which would violate the first rule 
of logic: do not block the road to inquiry.12 
 
 It is in the context of the explaining the development of the laws of nature (and thereby 
providing their explanation) that the Incompatibility Problem arises. If Reynolds is correct in 
thinking that the development of statistical methods in physics played a large role in Peirce’s 
scientific philosophy of explanation, then one of the principal aims of Peirce’s cosmological 
metaphysics is to explain how regularities such as laws of nature could develop from pure chance and 
evolve over time. The central question then is whether or not a successful explanation of the 
evolution of laws of nature is available to Peirce. He must have some way of explaining how such a 
process might take place. Peirce’s thesis of tychism, which involves the postulation of absolute 
chance in nature, is supposed to form the basis of the explanation. But this alone is not very 
enlightening. First, without further explication, it is not clear what “absolute chance” refers to or 
what its role is in the tychistic thesis. Furthermore, unless there is some explanation of how chance 
can result in the production of law, we do not have the explanation we desperately need.  
 
                                                
11
 1.175 Peirce’s ideas here about continuity and the growth of laws is cryptic, but see the section a few 
pages below on continuity for my account of why he thinks these are related.  
12
 EP2:48 
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 Above I said that Reynolds thinks that the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit 
Theorem play a large role in Peirce’s cosmology. In particular, these statistical results help explain 
how laws could form out of pure chance occurrences. Before discussing the role of these 
mathematical results, it is important to get clear on why Peirce thought that the laws of nature had 
to evolve out of chance. According to Peirce, the reason that we need to explain why the laws of 
nature are the way they are is because of the kind of thing they are. Laws of nature are the sorts of 
realities that are intrinsically “reasonable”13 and so are in need of an explanation. To simply assert of 
some particular reasonable fact or phenomenon that it is inexplicable is, according to Peirce, to 
commit the nominalist’s error of thinking that reality is fundamentally divorced from our ability to 
understand or apprehend it fully. Such an admission involves the notion that the fact is cut off in a 
fundamental way from reason, and this is something Peirce is unwilling to grant as possible. 
Whatever a law of nature is, it is certainly an intelligible reality of some kind, Peirce thought, so the 
idea that a law of nature is a brute fact, inexplicable in principle, Peirce practically countenanced as 
an intellectual sin. To assert that an intelligible thing is inexplicable is just to say that it is incapable 
of being intelligibly understood and therefore not intelligible. Laws of nature are determinate 
realities about which we can reason, so if we are not going to admit nominalism, in which case we 
would not be able to reason about laws of nature, there must be an explanation as to why the laws 
of nature, or regularities generally, exist; and there must be an explanation as to why they are the 





                                                
13
 See for example “Variety and Uniformity,” 6.88-101 
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Chance 
 
 According to Peirce, whereas generalities and regularities such as the laws of nature, along 
with particular facts or existing phenomena, require an explanation, such an explanation is not 
necessary for chance itself. Central to his philosophical project is the idea that philosophy should 
proceed in a scientific way, such that everything that deserves an explanation gets one. Like a 
persistent child, the scientist-philosopher should be able to say “but why?”, and mother nature had 
better not simply reply “Because I said so.” Peirce rejects metaphysical foundationalism on the 
grounds that it leads to nominalism.14 If the ultimate explanation or ontological ground of a 
phenomenon were an unexplainable or ontologically independent fact (or object, property, etc.), 
something that is fundamental or “basic” in  contemporary terms15, then the ultimate level of reality 
would be nominalistic in nature. If Peirce were to say that the existence and nature of laws of nature 
are grounded in a fundamental entity or entities, then his explanation of the laws of nature would 
run afoul of the very nominalism that he is trying to avoid. Peirce has two options. Either he can go 
infinitist about explanation16 whereby the chain of explanation does not terminate or “ground out” 
in a fundamental entity or explanation but proceeds indefinitely17, or he can attempt to ground the 
explanation of the laws of nature on something that is categorically distinct, something that is not 
such that it even could require an explanation. In any case, Peirce thinks that chance is simply not the 
kind of thing that requires an explanation. This may seem like slippery chicanery on his part, but the 
truth has to do with what was mentioned above about nominalism and facts. Peirce thinks that the 
                                                
14
 As a staunch realist, Peirce was strongly averse to nominalism. The reader need not worry exactly 
what Peirce means by “nominalism” except to note that, according to him, it is the denial of real 
generalities in nature. See Forster for a fuller analysis of this.  
15
 See Schaffer, 2010 
16
 Given his views, going infinitist about explanation will also result in going infinitist about ontology.  
17
 This is sometimes what is meant by the phrase “turtles all the way down”, a phrase that has its 
apocryphal origins with Russell.  
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nominalist commits the error of holding a reasonable aspect of reality to be incapable of being 
reasoned about. If, for example, a law of nature is the sort of thing that can be captured by reason, 
and Peirce thinks it can, then to say that it is merely a brute fact is essentially to assert that 
something capturable by reason cannot be reasoned about (it is brute, after all) and so is not 
capturable by reason. Peirce has no patience for this sort of contradiction, however subtle. It does 
not follow, however, that all facts whatsoever require an explanation. But such unexplainable 
phenomena have to be “reasonless” in a precise sense. The “reasonlessness” in question has to take 
the form of a hypothesis or abductive inference, such inferences being the sorts of things that help 
to explain phenomena--such as the diversity or variety of the world, for example. Only if this 
condition is met is Peirce willing to allow the possibility of a “brute fact” into his system.18 
According to Peirce, chance itself is not the kind of thing which could require an explanation 
because it is reasonless in just this way. He thinks that we can perform a kind of inference to the 
best explanation to discover that chance must be an operative feature of the world (e.g. it explains 
the world’s variety), but chance itself would not be what it is if there were any prior premises from 
which it could itself be derived. It does not require an explanation, nor is it its own explanation, 
since to claim this would be tantamount to saying that chance is not chance.  
 
 As Reynolds is keen to point out, Peirce appears to mean several things by chance, such as 
growth, variety, “nonlaw” or “real” chance, feeling, fortuity, freedom, and arbitrariness.19 Of these notions, it is 
the notion of chance as a violation of law, or absolute chance that Reynolds says Peirce focuses on as 
                                                
18
At the end of A Guess at the Riddle, Peirce mentions this. As an interesting side note, chance is not the 
only thing Peirce didn’t think required an explanation. He mentions the haecceity of individual existing 
particulars as also requiring no explanation, since these facts are just the sorts of things that are not 
intelligible objects of reason but rather abductively inferred hypotheses which we simply cannot extricate 
from our experience without great difficulty. They are, however, arrived at by a reasoning process, i.e. 
abduction. 
19
 6.612, 6.613, and 6.322 
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being fundamental to his analysis of the increasing complexity of the world and the development of 
laws of nature. Without some notion of a law-violating kind of chance, Peirce does not think it is 
possible to explain the variety that we observe in nature, since he thinks that no number of 
absolutely determinate mechanical laws would ever be able to result in the extreme differentiation 
we observe between various phenomena in nature, since “like causes will always produce like 
effects.”20 If the universe started out at some level of complexity, and if the only laws governing the 
universe were time-reversible mechanical laws acting everywhere and always in identical ways, the 
world would continue to have just exactly the complexity that it started with, or so Peirce thinks. On 
the contrary, something must explain the “marvellous and infinite diversity and manifoldness of 
things.”21 The only thing that could account for this diversity is an “absolute chance” element in 
nature, something that would not be subject to strict law but which would spontaneously deviate 
from regularity. Peirce thought that we could observe the effects of this spontaneous aspect of nature: 
“That there is an arbitrary element in the universe we see--namely its variety. This variety must be 
attributed to spontaneity in some form”22  
 
 It will hopefully become clear to the reader later that Peirce cannot mean to be saying that 
the laws of nature are “violated” by “nonlaw” chance events in such a way as to contravene the pre-
established patterns of Nature, which have already been laid down as unbreakable rules. But just in 
case, let us take note of it now. That account of laws would make no sense from the perspective of 
an evolutionary cosmology, which is intended to explain the emergence of those very laws. As 
Reynolds points out, Peirce cannot mean to say that the chance events in nature “violate” the laws in 
such a way as to deviate from fixed rules, because that account would presuppose the reality of those 
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rules, which are the very things chance is supposed to be explaining. On the contrary, there is a 
weaker sense of violation Peirce has in mind, although he does not do a very good job of signalling 
to his reader that he is employing this notion. The weaker notion is that of the laws of nature 
themselves not being strict or absolute. Peirce says, 
 
 The first [mistaken metaphysical principle] to go must be the 
proposition that every event in the universe is precisely determined by 
causes according to inviolable law. We have no reason to think that this is 
absolutely exact. Experience shows that it is so to a wonderful degree of 
approximation, and that is all...We know that when we try to verify any law 
of nature by experiment, we always find discrepancies between the 
observations and the theory. These we rightly refer to errors of 
observation; but why may there not be similar aberrations due to the 
imperfect obedience of facts to law?23 
 
 Even here it is tempting to read Peirce as saying that the laws of nature are already fixed and 
that chance is merely the spontaneous departure from the law, but it is clear from other passages 
that, insofar as Peirce considers laws of nature to involve uniform regularities (which he does), if we 
are to interpret him consistently, he must mean that the laws are not exact at any given stage of time. 
He says, for example, that “uniformities [i.e. laws] are never absolutely exact, so that the variety of 
the world is forever increasing”.24 We see once again that Peirce is appealing to the observable facts 
of the variety in nature as being reason to think that there is spontaneity or absolute chance 
operative in the world, even amidst the governance of laws. In some ways it starts to look like Peirce 
thinks that law and chance are mutually reinforcing in their production of the world we observe.25 
 
 






 And indeed, this is undoubtedly the case. Both law and chance are postulated as the consequence of 
abductive inferences. That is, Peirce is convinced that we must postulate these in order to explain 
experience.  
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Continuity 
 
 Consider again the following,  
 
Once you have embraced the principle of continuity no kind of explanation 
of things will satisfy you except that they grew.26  
 
 It might strike one as odd that Peirce says that it is in virtue of accepting the principle of 
continuity that one will be led to the notion that the laws of nature grew and developed over time. 
Peirce is unclear about this, and this is perhaps one of the few passages where he brings these two 
concepts together as explicitly related, so it is instructive to pause briefly and note what Peirce has in 
mind with respect to continuity. For him, a true continuum of any kind is such as to contain non-
denumerably many instances of whatever quality the continuum in question is a continuum of. 
Moreover, Peirce thought that the correct analysis of continuity is in terms of infinitesimal 
quantities, quantities which are merely possible until they are designated from the continuum itself.27 
This implies that the continuum Peirce has in mind is strictly denser than the ordinary continuum 
contemporary mathematicians and physicists are used to, which is usually understood as being one-
to-one with the real numbers. On the contrary, the “true” continuum, according to Peirce, involves 
there being between any two members more members beyond all number.28  
 
The exact nature of Peirce’s continuum need not concern us here. What is important to note 
is that Peirce thought that the doctrine that continuity is a basic feature of the world, which he called 
                                                
26
 1.175  
27
 See RLT Introduction by Putnam for an excellent overview of this topic. 
28
 There is an interesting parallel to the contemporary concept of hypergunk in mereology. Hypergunk 
consists in a continuum of parts such that each part is composed of further parts of a cardinality strictly 
higher than the number of parts they compose. See Hazen, 2004 and Nolan, 2004 
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synechism, was the only acceptable explanation of a variety of phenomena found in nature, including 
the operations of the mind.29 I believe that the relationship synechism has with the evolution of laws 
of nature is the following. In order to avoid nominalism, Peirce is committed to laws being 
explainable. A law must be explained by something which does not itself require explanation, and we 
have seen that Peirce thinks chance can do the job (though we have yet to see how). One might 
wonder why the laws could not simply spring forth from pure chaos in one fell swoop, going from 
complete disorder to perfect uniformity in an instant. That would, after all, still explain the laws in 
terms of something that does not require explanation thereby avoiding malicious nominalism, which 
is what we wanted. We can imagine a story such as what is sometimes given by popular 
contemporary cosmologists with respect to the Big Bang, according to which the laws of nature did 
not exist until the moment of creation when they spontaneously (by chance?) emerged fixed for all 
time.30 As is evident from the quote above, Peirce would not accept such a story, and the reason I 
believe, is because of his commitment to synechism. According to this doctrine, time forms a true 
continuity so that between any two events there are non-denumerably many other events. There is 
no sense in which the laws of nature could spontaneously jump from a state of indeterminate non-
existence to perfect regularity without going through the transfinite interval of time between states. 
Since this is so, the only explanation the synechist can give of the development of laws out of 
chance is one in which the laws of nature evolved over time, or “grew” to use Peirce’s term, into 
what they are. Even if we suppose (as Peirce does not) that after some time they stopped growing so 
that they are now fixed, no matter how small an interval we take, the time during which the law 
                                                
29
 See “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” EP1:11.  
30
 I am not intending to suggest that this is the story cosmologists actually accept, that it is plausible, or 
even that it is remotely adequate for explaining the laws of nature. There is, for one thing, no clear parallel 
in this story to any chance-like events prior to the Big Bang out of which the laws could arise--although 
something like this seems to be up for discussion according to Krause, 2012.  
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emerged will always involve a process of coming to be rather than a discontinuous jump into 
existence.  
 
II .  Tychis t i c  Tensions 
 
Andrew Reynolds argues that there is a tension in Peirce’s cosmology, which is a result of 
attempting to combine two different analyses of how the laws of nature are supposed to arise from 
chance. I thought it necessary to begin by catching the reader up to speed on the Peircean 
background so that she would not feel too lost. Now it is time to move into the heart of the 
problem.  
 
 Briefly, the problem, as Reynolds points out, is that Peirce relies upon two different 
explanations for how the laws of nature emerged from the primordial, indeterminate, chance chaos 
that preceded the existence of the universe: the Law of Habit  and the Law of Large Numbers. The 
task of this chapter is to explore what these concepts amount to for Peirce and why Reynolds thinks 
they are mutually unsatisfiable analyses on Peirce’s account.  
 
The Law of Large Numbers 
 
 Although the term “law of large numbers” sounds difficult and technical, the intuitive idea 
behind the law is commonplace. An example will help illustrate this idea. I want to be clear, 
however, that the following example is not intended to track Peirce’s understanding of the Law of 
Large Numbers. Rather, it is meant to give the reader an intuitive idea of the basic workings of the 
Law of Large Numbers as it appears in everyday life. The example to follow, therefore, somewhat 
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blurs epistemology and metaphysics, but this is no serious matter. We will attempt to grasp the concept 
first and become more precise later.   
 
Imagine you are at a carnival, and situated between the petting zoo and the ferris wheel is a 
giant gumball machine filled with red and green gumballs. I approach you with a challenge: I will bet 
you cannot guess the correct proportion of green gumballs in the machine. Now, the rules are, you 
make take out one gumball at a time and observe it, but you must place it back in the tank before 
grabbing a new gumball. You may do this as many times as you like before making your guess. You 
may shake the tank around and shuffle the gumballs as much as you want as long as you are careful 
not to spill them. 
 
Of course, in our toy example, it is I who will be conned, and the reason why is very 
commonplace. Suppose that you knew the gumballs had been shaken together quite thoroughly. 
You would have every reason to believe that your chance of picking out, say, five green gumballs at 
once on this occasion is just as likely as on any other occasion, because if the tank were shaken 
vigorously enough, the gumballs should be randomly distributed throughout the container. If I were 
to let you pick out half of the gumballs and compare them, and if you knew they were randomly 
shaken up beforehand, you would have a good reason to believe that whatever the proportion of 
green to red gumballs you observed there would also hold true of the total collection. After all, it 
would be very unlikely that you would draw that many at one time and observe a serious deviance 
from the true proportion, unless the gumballs were not really randomized beforehand. Likewise, the 
more times you were allowed to draw half of the gumballs and observe them, the more sure you 
would be that your estimation was correct.  
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It should be fairly obvious that how many gumballs you are allowed to take out of the tank 
at one time is not going to affect your ability to make a good guess as long as 1) you can be sure the 
gumballs are randomly distributed in the container, 2) you are allowed to pick out and throw back 
gumballs as many times as you want, and 3) you don’t specifically try to pick certain gumballs. All 
you will have to do to guess the right proportion of green gumballs is draw a gumball and record the 
answer, toss it back in and shake the container to randomize the candy, draw again, record, shake, 
etc. After a while, you will be able to look at your recordings and simply count up how many green 
samples you took versus all the samples you took. That proportion will be close to the true 
proportion of green gumballs to all of the gumballs in the container. The more times you took 
samples, the more accurate your result would be.  
 
 This is an intuitive idea. It applies to many different fields of inquiry, generally wherever 
estimation is required. There are plenty of examples one could contrive to demonstrate how 
commonplace this kind of reasoning is; so much so that technical talk about statistics often seems to 
confuse the general point unless one really desires an extremely precise understanding of the law. 
We shall have to get a little more precise for our purposes here, but not much.  
 
The reason you are able to estimate the number of gumballs in the example above is because 
two conditions hold. First, the gumballs are independent of one another, and second, your selection 
of them is a random process. There is nothing about selecting one kind of gumball that influences 
which one you will pick next. They are not connected in any way. Choosing a red gumball does not 
increase the probability that you will get a green one next time. Notice that it is important that you 
always put the gumballs back into the container. If you did not, then the choosing of a red gumball 
would increase the probability of getting a green one next time, because you would have changed the 
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overall proportion. Likewise, you shake up the container each time, which ensures that your 
selection process is fair. That way, you are equally likely to get any given gumball on any occasion as 
on any other. You pick them quite randomly. The fact that, given that these conditions hold and a 
large number of samples are taken, the average number of green gumballs in your samples will 
approximate the average number of green gumballs in the whole tank is just one example of the Law 
of Large Numbers. 
 
 More technically, what the Law of Large Numbers says is that if, for some population being 
measured, if the samples taken from the population are independent from one another (where a 
sample consists in making a measurement of a certain kind of variable), and if the samples are 
known to be or observed to be roughly alike in character (that is, they really do pertain to the same 
population) then the mean of the samples taken together approximates the mean of the population 
(or distribution of the intended variable) so that as the number of samples increases the sample 
mean approaches the distribution mean and, at infinity, reaches it.  
 
Consider again the gumballs. The population is the total collection of gumballs in the 
container. The samples are your various occasions of picking a gumball. The variable in question is 
the green colored gumball. The Law of Large Numbers says that if you randomly take samples from 
the population, looking for some variable, and if the samples are independent from one another, then 
as the number of samples increases, the proportion of times that variable will be observed among 
the samples approximates the proportion that variable occurs in the whole population to an 
increasing degree of likelihood, such that the probability at infinity that the proportion of the 
variable found in the samples equals the proportion found in the population is one. If you take a 
billion samples and find that, on average, the gumball is green twenty percent of the time, then 
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(assuming the number of gumballs in the tank is much less than a billion) it is almost certain that 
about twenty percent of the gumballs in the tank are green. 
 
Notice that the word “independent” could have different meanings. On the one hand, there 
is a notion of what I will call metaphysical independence, which is about the relationship the underlying 
objects of observation in the sample have to one another. On the other hand, there is the sense of 
independence which applies to the observations themselves, which I will call epistemic independence. 
For most mathematical purposes, these two senses of independence are interchangeable for one 
another in a pretty harmless way, which is perhaps why few mathematics textbooks appear to draw 
any distinction. They are different but related. In our toy example, it is both true that the gumballs in 
the sample are metaphysically independent--the color of one gumball does not affect the others, nor 
does the selecting of one color increase or decrease the likelihood of selecting any other color--and 
also that the observations taken when we take gumballs from the tank are epistemically independent, 
in the sense that nothing about taking any given gumball is going to increase or decrease the 
probability of observing one of the same or a different color the next trial. In one sense, the 
epistemic independence of the observations is explained by the metaphysical independence of the 
gumballs and the fact that we took samples at random; we would expect that if we took random 
observations of metaphysically independent objects, the observations themselves will not impact one 
another. They are, after all, randomly drawn, and the objects they measure are not connected with 
one another in any way that would cause the observation of one to affect a subsequent 
observation.31 The two do not have to go hand in hand, however. It could be that the underlying 
                                                
31
 One might object that the observations are then metaphysically independent, and so there is no need 
for this distinction. This is correct, and it probably accounts for why mathematicians usually don’t draw 
this distinction, but it can still be helpful, because otherwise, we are likely to forget that there is a 
difference between saying the elements of the underlying distribution being observed are independent 
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distribution of objects are, in fact, connected and dependent, but we could still take random samples 
of the distribution in such a way that our observations were independent from one another. Indeed, if 
we did so long enough, we would discover that the underlying distribution consisted of dependent 
elements, because our observations of them would reveal a pattern different from what we would 
expect to see if they were truly independent.32 
 
This account is, very roughly and without too much technicality, how the Law of Large 
Numbers works. It will be important later to remember some of the conditions that need to be met 
in order to satisfy the Law of Large Numbers. For the mathematics to work, the samples taken from 
the underlying distribution have to be independent from one another, and they must be taken 
randomly.  
 
But what has all of this to do with Peirce and the laws of nature? For one thing, Peirce 
thought that the Law of Large Numbers was the analysis whereby we can make sense of irreversible 
processes in the world. He was intensely concerned to demonstrate that the universe could not be 
governed merely by mechanical law, which he thought was a somewhat obvious fact deducible from 
observing irreversible processes such as organic development and the tendency of a gas to achieve 
thermal equilibrium. Such commonplace but--from the perspective of a purely mechanical 
understanding of lawhood--bizarre occurrences require an explanation. That is, if everything in 
nature is governed by purely Newtonian laws, which are time-reversible, it is odd that we never 
observe such things as an egg unbreaking itself or a glass of water unspilling itself. There is nothing 
                                                                                                                                                       
from one another and saying that the elements of the set of observations are independent from one 
another. The former is about the world, whereas the latter is about our record keeping.  
32
 For example: if there were a coin such that tossing it and getting heads increased the chance that 
heads would turn up in the future, then if we took random samples of coin tosses (where each 
observation was not influenced by any others), we would discover that there is a connection between the 
actual coin tosses. 
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in the Newtonian description of things which would make such occurrences impossible. And yet, we 
never do observe this; instead we are confronted with all kinds of irreversible phenomena.33 What 
could explain this? As we saw earlier the only such explanation Peirce thought would not slip into 
nominalism is one that attributes such phenomena to chance. Fortunately, as Peirce was keen to 
note, there is a mathematically precise way of spelling out just how regularities and uniformities can 
result from chance processes, given by Bernoulli's law of “high numbers” as Peirce calls it, or the 
Law of Large Numbers. Peirce says: 
 
The conception of fortuitous variation is so exact that it can be expressed by a 
mathematical equation. In fact, it is expressed by the formula which expresses the 
conduction of heat, the action of viscosity, and the diffusion of gases. All these phenomena 
are explained by physicists as results of Bernoulli’s law of high numbers, where the same idea 
of multitude reappears which is directly involved in the Darwinian hypothesis. The same 
formula shows itself in the doctrine of chances, in the theory of errors of observations, and 
in the logic of inductive reasoning. As well as we can make it out, the law of mental 
association, which is at least strongly analogous to induction, is probably of the same form. 
All these things seem to be connected. 34 
 
In the passage above, Peirce is pointing to the fact that the use of the Law of Large 
Numbers, which he calls “Bernoulli’s law of high numbers,” is commonplace in the natural sciences. 
From measurements of physical values to variations in temperature, variation appears to often 
center around a mean value fitting the normal bell curve, sometimes called the error curve since it 
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 There is one exception that I know of, which is the phenomenon of laminar flow. It is only a pseudo-
exception, but the reader is encouraged to look up videos online demonstrating the effect. 
34
 NEM2: 200-01 
  29 
The Laws of Physics as Statistical 
 
Among the reasons for Peirce’s interest in the statistical results in mathematics (besides their use in 
the theory of errors, chemistry, and observational science) is that Peirce aimed to show that the 
dominant account of laws of nature in the 19th Century, the so-called mechanical philosophy or 
“necessitarianism,” as he sometimes calls it, is false.  
 
What Peirce means by the “mechanical philosophy” is the belief, popular among 19th Century 
scientists, that the universe is like a gigantic mechanism or machine with the motions of its many 
particles forming a single system that, like some perfectly designed clockwork, behaves in an exactly 
regular way with respect to the Newtonian forces. The idea is that the motion of any given particle, 
being subject to exact, uniform laws of motion, would behave in exactly similar ways under identical 
circumstances, so that its position at any given time would be predictable given a sufficient amount 
of antecedent information concerning other like bodies with which the particle might interact. The 
same goes for every other particle in the universe. The picture of the world on this account forms 
the basis of Laplace’s demonic thought experiment: 
  
 We may regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its past and the cause 
of its future. An intellect which at a certain moment would know all forces that set nature in 
motion, and all positions of all items of which nature is composed, if this intellect were also 
vast enough to submit these data to analysis, it would embrace in a single formula the 
movements of the greatest bodies of the universe and those of the tiniest atom; for such an 
intellect nothing would be uncertain and the future just like the past would be present before 
its eyes.35 
 
It would be an understatement to say that Peirce took issue with this view of the world. In 
fact, he devoted a considerable amount of writing to refuting it in, for example, “The Doctrine of 
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 Laplace, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities  
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Necessity Examined” and other places. What Peirce saw as insufficient with the mechanical 
philosophy is largely the fact that the deterministic view of the world implies (which suggests that 
the past determines the future as much as the future determines the past) that every phenomenon 
falling under its purview is in principle a reversible phenomenon. The world for a Laplacian demon 
looks the same both backwards and forwards, since all that is necessary for reversing any given 
mechanical process is for the Newtonian forces involved to change their directions without 
modifying their magnitudes. No such reversal is going to happen in general, but there is no reason it 
could not in principle. In one thought experiment, Peirce imagines that several particles travelling 
through space encounter a perfectly elastic surface, whereupon they are reflected back in exactly the 
same course as they had come with the exact same energy and velocity.36 But, as a matter of simple 
observational fact, although it is possible, according to this view, for processes to run in reverse, 
such reverses are never observed. The mechanical philosophy thus leaves these processes 
unexplained, Peirce thought, because it would minimally have to explain why we never observe this. 
As we will see below, the mechanical philosophy would have a hard time answering this question--if 
it is even possible to adequately answer it within the mechanical framework--because it seems the 
only satisfactory account would involve commitment to at least some general (in contrast to 
particular) features playing a role in natural irreversible processes.   
 
It is easy to see why Peirce thought this, especially once one comes to understand his 
reasoning in a little more detail. As Thomas Short points out in Peirce’s Theory of Signs, the statistical 
mechanical account of explaining the behaviour of large numbers of objects--such as, for example, 
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 It might be objected here that no such situation could happen since there are no perfectly elastic 
bodies, and some of the energy would be lost to heat during the required transaction. To argue this, 
however, is to concede Peirce’s point. For such an objection rests upon the assumption that we can make 
sense of the nature of heat by appealing to thermodynamics, which is the very sort of statistical theory 
that Peirce is trying to get his reader to understand as involving non-conservative forces.  
  31 
the independent motions of trillions of molecules--involves a wholly different picture of the world 
from what the mechanical account offers, and this fact, though somewhat obvious once noticed, 
often does not get much attention. There is a widespread tendency to think that because the 
statistical account of the behaviour of gases near equilibrium is compatible with each gas molecule 
being governed by purely conservative Newtonian forces, that the statistical analysis of the tendency 
for the gas to achieve certain distributions is itself a mechanical one. But this is false, as Short 
explains. Keeping with the spirit of analysis that Peirce himself adheres to, Short notes that 
mechanical causation takes place between particulars, and a mechanical explanation is one that 
makes explicit reference to the relationship between two or more particular objects.37 This sort of 
explanation is, by its nature, nominalistic, since it is ontologically committed to, and only to, 
individual existences. If we only consider two or three particles that move about according to 
classical Newtonian models, then, assuming we cash out the Newtonian forces involved as 
descriptions of behaviour and not metaphysically dubious realities, our explanation as to why 
particle A is observed to be barrelling down a certain path through space with thus and such velocity 
can be put entirely in terms of facts about its relationship to particle B into which it has just crashed, 
provided that we spell out in a bit of detail some of the specifics about particle velocities, masses, 
densities and so forth. Such an explanation does not make reference to generalities at all. It relates 
particulars to particulars, or tokens to tokens. It does not relate a token to a type or a particular to a 
general (kind, universal, etc.).  
 
Statistical explanations, for example thermodynamic ones, are not at all like this. For they 
make explicit use of various kinds of outcomes (generally, equilibrium states in thermodynamics). 
Short gives a nice example of this kind of explanation, which looks to me to be an abridged version 
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of the account Sklar gives in his Physics and Chance.38 The account is this. Imagine that before us is a 
container filled with a gas. We imagine that the container is divided into m three-dimensional cubical 
cells,  that the gas is comprised of n molecules, and that m<n. We will also assume that n is fairly 
large and that what it means for the gas to be evenly distributed (roughly) throughout the volume of 
the container is for each cell to contain n/m molecules, plus or minus e, where e is considerably 
smaller than n/m.39 Since e can vary, there will be a wide range of even distributions of this type, and 
if we stipulate that e is not too small, the set of even distributions will form a class much larger than 
the complement class--the set of distributions that are uneven.  
 
Once we have these concepts in mind, we can talk about certain observations of gasses that 
we are likely to make. We can observe that a gas is evenly distributed throughout a container, for 
example. We call this observed distribution the macrostate of the gas; it is the overall behaviour of 
the entire system of molecules as coarsely measured either by our senses or through instrumentation. 
For any given macrostate at a single time, there is exactly one microstate constituting it, where a 
microstate is understood to be the exact position of each molecule in the system relative to the 
volume of the container in question. Obviously, given what was said above, there are a huge number 
of microstates compatible with any given macrostate, because e can vary widely. No particular 
microstate is observable since such systems are far too complex to measure, their involving trillions 
of molecules in rapid motion. 
 
Just as there are many possible microstates constituting any macrostate, there being far more 
evenly distributed microstates than unevenly distributed ones, there are likewise far more ways for a 
system of molecules to go from an unevenly distributed microstate to an evenly distributed one. And 
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so, it is far more likely in a given stretch of time that an observed macrostate of a gas will become 
evenly distributed--there are just way more possible microstates compatible with an evenly 
distributed macrostate than an unevenly distributed one. These facts explain why we almost never 
observe such strange events as mixtures of fluids unmixing themselves or heat spontaneously 
“collecting” on only one side of a pan.  
 
But what makes this explanation so special and uniquely statistical? According to Short, such 
a statistical account requires a conceptual shift toward thinking of the world in a statistical way, 
rather than conceiving of it in a purely mechanical way. Short provides a thought experiment to help 
us see this. 40  Imagine, he says, that we were Laplacean demons in whose possession are 
extraordinary powers of calculation, especially that of computing complex differential equations. 
But, Short says, we must also pretend that, despite having godlike powers of observation, memory, 
and calculation, we have an extremely impoverished understanding of statistics. We have simply not 
needed this kind of analysis before. Now Short has us imagine that we observe a gas in a thermally 
isolated and fixed volume at time T. The world is assumed to be Newtonian, and we demons are 
able to observe each and every molecule of the gas at T and measure its momentum, velocity, 
position, etc. From this, we can calculate those qualities at any other time in the future (or past, if we 
want) T’. Now suppose that the gas is unevenly distributed. By dividing the region into cells as 
before, we can calculate the distribution of the gas at time T’. We will observe that the gas becomes 
more evenly distributed during the interval (T,T’). But without a statistical understanding of the 
universe, we will have no idea why the gas should do this except that, given the initial setup of the 
system of molecules, this is how things played out. If we continue to observe the gas, we will notice 
that, for any time T* later than T, the gas will continue to become more evenly distributed. No 
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matter how many times we observe this happening, we will not be able to explain this phenomenon 
in general until we have a statistical understanding of the world. Importantly, the statistical 
explanation that we need to make sense of this general behaviour relies on understanding that 
certain distributions (even ones) come about with higher probability than others because of the type, 
or kind, of thing they are. Even distributions are the kinds of states that are easier to achieve given any 
particular microstate. To really explain the general evolution of a gas, as the Second Law of 
Thermodynamics does, the explanation in question must make essential reference to non-
mechanical principles--principles that do not merely relate token particulars to particulars, but which 
relate particulars (e.g. particular microstates) to general types (e.g. even distributions).  
 
This kind of explanation made a great impression on Peirce. It seemed to him that such 
statistical accounts were related to the concept of evolution and growth to the extent that only they 
could explain these processes. Regular mechanical causation simply would not do. Peirce says: 
 
The law of the conservation of energy is equivalent to the proposition that all 
operations governed by mechanical laws are reversible; so that an immediate corollary from 
it is that growth is not explicable by those laws, even if they be not violated in the process of 
growth.41 
 
Peirce is clear that such statistical accounts are directly related to the application of the Law of Large 
Numbers to physical phenomena: 
 
 [The] kinetical theory would account, in a remarkably satisfactory way, for non 
conservative phenomena...by representing that they are results of chance; or, if you please, of 
the law of high numbers.42 
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It is important to keep these things in mind, since Peirce also says that the only satisfactory 
account of the laws of nature--that is, why they are what they are--is that they are the result of 
growth. According to what was just said, growth can only be accounted for by means of a statistical 
explanation involving the Law of Large Numbers. We shall see later the ways this can potentially 
create trouble for Peirce.  
 
In addition to working as the explanation for the lawlike behaviour of such irreversible 
phenomena as the Second Law, Peirce believed that a really scientific metaphysics would have to 
view even the allegedly exact mechanical laws as at best highly regular but inexact uniformities 
themselves the result of chance occurrences. Peirce was convinced that in order to explain the 
immense variety in nature, the scientific metaphysician must postulate the existence of real “absolute 
chance” as being an operative force in the world. Recall how he says, for example, that when 
investigating the world according to the lights of his synechistic philosophy (including the principle 
of fallibilism), among the first traditionally believed propositions that must be thrown out is “the 
proposition that every event in the universe is precisely determined by causes according to inviolable 
law.”43 Instead, “we have no reason to believe this is absolutely exact. Experience shows that it is so 
to a wonderful degree of approximation, and that is all.” Note that, whereas it might seem that 
Peirce is merely pointing to the effects of observation, that whenever a scientist goes to measure an 
effect in the world, she will inevitably discover there is some error in her measurement, this is too 
weak for Peirce’s purposes. Immediately following the above quote, he says: 
 
We know that when we try to verify any law of nature by experiment, we always find 
discrepancies between the observations and the theory. These we rightly refer to errors of 
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observation; but why may there not be similar aberrations due to the imperfect obedience of 
facts to law?44 
 
Here Peirce raises the possibility that chance is operative in nature to the extent that even the 
mechanical laws of nature are not exact. He continues: 
 
We are brought, then, to this: conformity to law exists only with a limited range of 
events and even there is not perfect, for an element of pure spontaneity or lawless originality 
mingles, or at least must be supposed to mingle, with law everywhere. Moreover, conformity 
with law is a fact requiring to be explained; and since law in general cannot be explained by 
any law in particular, the explanation must consist in showing how law is developed out of 
pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy.45  
 
And also in Variety and Uniformity: 
 
Uniformities are never absolutely exact, so that the variety of the universe is forever 
increasing. At the same time we hold that even these departures from law are subject to a 
certain law of probability, and that in the present state of the universe they are far too small 
to be detected by our observations...We therefore suppose that all law is the result of 
evolution, and to suppose this is to suppose it to be imperfect.46 
 
Presumably, the “certain law of probability” Peirce speaks of here is Bernoulli’s “law of high 
numbers” or the Law of Large Numbers, which he makes so much use of when analyzing 
uniformities broadly. What he seems to have in mind is the idea that, just as an even distribution of 
gas molecules in a fixed volume, or equilibrium state, inevitably results from the chance encounters 
of trillions of molecules, so the ultimate value of a law of nature results from a statistical variance 
within a possible range of values. A law of nature, say the law of gravity, which subsists between two 
objects may be subject to minute fluctuations, but the aberrations would be extremely slight and 
infrequent, so as to likely be unobservable to us, and the overall trend will be for these fluctuations 
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to cancel out as the Law of Large Numbers would require so that the trend over time is for the 
possible range of values that the law could take will get increasingly narrow and, at the end of 
eternity, become exact.  
 
 Earlier, I said that Peirce appeals to indeterminacy in order to explain the evolution of the 
laws of nature because he thinks that the extreme variety of nature could not be explained without 
appealing to absolute chance. I think it is worth pausing briefly to see how strange this can sound 
given what has been said above concerning the explanatory role of the statistical mechanical account 
of gas laws. Among the things that the statistical account is supposed to provide is an explanation of 
the existence of growth, in particular irreversible processes. Peirce seems to identify this kind of 
growth with both chance and heterogeneous variety.47 But in the example of the diffusion of gases 
above, the only growth present was a growth toward an even and (relatively) homogeneous 
distribution of particles. There is very little variety about it, but there is still a process of growth 
toward an end. Why is Peirce so insistent that we must postulate absolute chance in order to explain 
the world’s variety?  
 
I suspect that what Peirce intends his reader to understand is that although a purely 
mechanical account of the motions of individual molecules combined with a statistical 
understanding of particle distributions is enough to explain the growth toward an even distribution 
of gas particles in a container, such an account could not explain the uneven distribution that we 
started with. Only chance could do that. It is chance in one sense.48 The world that we inhabit is 
much more like an unevenly distributed gas than it is like the even homogeneous macrostate at the 
end of our thought experiment above. Additionally, if we ever observe an increase in variety, which 
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Peirce thinks we do, then this fact cannot be explained by purely mechanical law, even if we have the 
statistical account at our disposal, because the Law of Large Numbers works to produce general 
uniformities out of diverse phenomena not the other way around.  
 
We should, then, be careful. What Peirce means by growth is not the mere fixating on a mean 
value determined by the Law of Large Numbers as in the tendency of a gas to achieve 
thermodynamic equilibrium. Instead, he has in mind the kind of growth involved in the production 
of novelty: 
 
All the evolution we know of proceeds from the vague to the definite. The 
indeterminate future becomes the irrevocable past. In Spencer’s phrase the undifferentiated 
differentiates itself. The homogeneous puts on heterogeneity.49 
 
The Law of Large Numbers and, as we will see, the Law of Habit are what produce 
irreversible and non-mechanical lawlike behaviour in the world, but the source of variety and novelty 
is due to chance. As laws of nature, along with anything else that evolves, are produced over time, 
“the chance divergences from law are perpetually acting to increase the variety of the world...so that 
the general result may be described as ‘organized heterogeneity,’ or, better, rationalized variety.”50 
 
The Law of Habit 
 
  In addition to analysing the evolution of the laws of nature in terms of a statistical account, 
Peirce gave a second, and it can seem, more fundamental account of the evolution of laws via the 
“Law of Habit”. In what follows, it will be important to keep in mind that Peirce’s philosophical 
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architectonic is an idealist one. Peirce called his metaphysics objective idealism, and there are several 
respects in which his philosophical starting points are going to seem odd, if not downright 
implausible, to the contemporary reader. I do not think very much rides on Peirce’s idealism, since 
his arguments are interesting regardless, and the idealism involved does not affect the substance of 
the central question of this paper. Nevertheless, it is a good idea to flag it right away, because doing 
so will help make sense of the analogy that Peirce makes between the behaviour of physical 
phenomena such as laws of nature and the behavior of biological phenomena, including nerve cells, 
and the behaviour of mind generally construed.  
 
 In his 1892 essay, “The Law of Mind,” Peirce set out to give an account of the “general law 
of mental action,” which he would in that essay call the law of mind but in other places refer to as the 
Law of Habit, and sometimes the law of association. In the introduction to the essay, Peirce mentions 
that he had previously given an inkling of an account of his evolutionary cosmology in terms of his 
concept of tychism, which is the idea that absolute chance is operative in nature. He says: 
 
I have begun by showing that ty chism  must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, 
in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to 
a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partly 
deadened mind.51 
 
Here we see a bit of Peirce’s inclination toward idealism, which he is very forthright about. 
The theme of matter being “partly deadened” mind is a recurring one in Peirce’s writings. Recall, for 
example, how Peirce identifies chance with feeling. As we will see more of later, Peirce wanted to 
identify the chance spontaneity of nature with this feeling and formulate an evolutionary account of 
nature whereby reality grows from a state of energetic and, one might even say, lively feelings into a 
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general, predictable, and regular system. Peirce thought the universe was already part of the way 
through this evolution, the familiar material world consisting in “merely mind hidebound with 
habits.”52 He is aware that he is likely to face objections to his idealism on the grounds that it is too 
anthropomorphic, but he is, as Reynolds says, “surprisingly candid” on this matter.53 Peirce says that 
“every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon is a hypothesis that there is something in 
nature to which the human reason is analogous.”54 
 
In any case, Peirce thinks he needs to give an independent analysis of his evolutionary 
cosmology--one from the perspective of psychology--and this notion coheres well with his overall 
pragmatist epistemology, which treats all inquiry, philosophical or otherwise, as analogous to 
scientific reasoning. What he appears to have in mind is the idea that, just as a scientific theory is 
regarded as more likely to be true--and less likely to be ad hoc-- if multiple lines of inquiry lead to 
the formulation of that theory, his account of evolutionary cosmology has more going for it if 
multiple independent lines of philosophical work lead back to it as a hypothesis to explain the results 
in those areas. Accordingly, he sets out to explain his concept of continuity in “The Law of Mind,” 
and he thinks this idea will lead back to the notion of an evolutionary cosmology.  
 
 Peirce begins with the law of mind. Reynolds says that, “The law of mind is essentially 
Peirce’s expression of the eighteenth-century English school of associationist psychology developed 
by Gay, Hartley, Berkeley, and Hume.”55 He notes further that Peirce came to identify the law of 
mind with the law of association, according to which individual ideas are generalized over time to 
form new ideas and, in particular, habits of thought. While the advances of modern neuroscience 
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were unknown at the time, Peirce and his contemporaries were aware of the fact that nerve cells 
could be trained to behave in specific ways by being repeatedly stimulated together, so that 
eventually the stimulation of one nerve cell or group of cells will propagate a signal to another group 
of cells with some regularity. The earlier associationists, while having no access to these biological 
facts, were aware that once several thoughts are brought together in the mind repeatedly, the mind 
begins to generalize them into one idea, so that when one of a group of thoughts is thought, or one 
instance of a kind of idea is thought,  a general idea or group of associated ideas is called up. An easy 
example is basic mathematics. It does not take very long for a child to realize, upon being made 
aware of the fact that one apple and another always makes two apples and one orange and one 
orange always makes two oranges, that one of anything and one of anything else makes up two 
somethings. Likewise, it is very soon after learning that individual barking things with four legs and a 
fluffy tail are called dogs that children generalize this idea to the notion of a dog in the abstract.56  It 
is this idea that the law of mind essentially involves habits that is so important for our purposes 
here.  
 
 Reynolds says that habit is just another expression for generalization for Peirce. And Peirce 
identifies generalization with the “spreading” of ideas or “feelings” as Peirce calls them.57 But this is 
a mysterious way of cashing out what is going on. What exactly are habits supposed to be? Reynolds 
says, “In essence, a habit is just a tendency to behave on future occasions as on similar past ones.”58 
This accords well with what Peirce says on the matter, given that his law of mind concerns the 
development and spreading of ideas via habits. For example, Peirce says: 
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The one primary and fundamental law of mental actions consists in a tendency to 
generalization. Feeling tends to spread; connections between feelings awaken feelings; 
neighboring feelings become assimilated; ideas are apt to reproduce themselves. These are so many 
formulations of the one law of the growth of mind.59 
 
Notice here the idea that the process of association involved in the generalization of these “feelings” 
or ideas contains two notions: 
(1) that the ideas become fused together and generalized by some form of reproduction,  
and, 
(2) that this process may not be an exact one, since the ideas are only “apt” to reproduce.  
 
This points to what Peirce has to say about the nature of habits more generally, that they are 
what facilitate the process of evolution from variety to uniformity.60 But moreover, it points to 
something else: a universal tendency--a general Law of Habit formation. Peirce is aiming to show 
that there is a universal principle operative in the world that is analogous to the law of mind, or 
association. Given his objective idealism, these amount to fundamentally the same thing. Just as 
general ideas evolve out of the spreading of ideas in the mind via the law of mind, which makes it so 
that “feelings and ideas attach themselves in thought so as to form systems,”61 so laws of nature 
develop out of the spreading of “ideas” in nature, as habits form between phenomena and “weld” 
them together into a system. Although Peirce does not usually use the terms Law of Habit and law of 
mind interchangeably within the same essay, a judicious sample of quotes ought to make it obvious 
that he means the same thing by the terms: 
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 [T]he laws of the universe have been formed under a universal tendency of all things 
toward generalization and habit-taking.62 
 
Instead of supposing mind to be governed by blind mechanical law, [Peirce’s 
synechism] supposes the one original law to be the recognized law of mind, the law of 
association, of which the laws of matter are regarded as mere special results.63 
 
These passages refer explicitly to the law of mind as doing the work of bringing about the 
laws of nature. But in “A Guess at the Riddle”, one of Peirce’s most explicit discussions of the 
development of uniformities (e.g. laws) in nature, he puts the matter this way (quoting him at some 
length): 
 
Uniformities in the modes of action of things have come about by their taking 
habits...the tendency to obey laws has always been and always will be growing. We look back 
toward a point in the infinitely distant past when there was no law but mere indeterminacy; 
we look forward to a point in the infinitely distant future when there will be no 
indeterminacy or chance but a complete reign of law. But at any assignable date in the past, 
however early, there was already some tendency toward uniformity; and at any assignable 
date in the future there will be some slight aberrancy from law. Moreover, all things have a 
tendency to take habits. For atoms and their parts...and in short every conceivably real 
object, there is a greater probability of acting as on a former like occasion than 
otherwise...this tendency...is a generalizing tendency; it causes actions in the future to follow 
some generalization of past actions.64 
 
This is none other than the law of mind applied to the universe as a whole, which given 
Peirce’s objective idealism is not too surprising of a move for him to make. Notice here that Peirce 
is arguing for the evolutionary development of laws of nature out of a general tendency for regular 
behavior. This tendency is exactly analogous to--and indeed, if we accept the thesis of objective 
idealism, just is--the law of mental association, or the law of mind. It works by establishing habits, or 
tendencies, between phenomena through the spreading of ideas, in the case of ordinary mental 
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action, or through the chance correlations between physical events. This Law of Habit results in 
generalities and in uniform behaviours, which, ultimately, Peirce thinks, results in quasi-mechanical 
and, at the end of eternity, perfectly regular behaviours.  
 
The above process is a general description of (1) that was mentioned earlier with respect to 
the law of mind, and it goes part way toward describing (2), since Peirce speaks of there being a 
greater probability of objects behaving on subsequent occasions as on former ones. Once we notice 
that the law of mind and the Law of Habit are fundamentally the same, we can see that the Law of 
Habit, as with the law of mind, is to be understood stochastically, as is evidenced from the 
following: 
 
The law of mind only makes a given feeling more likely  to arise. It thus resembles the 
“non-conservative” forces of physics, such as viscosity and the like, which are due to 
statistical uniformities in the chance encounters of trillions of molecules.65 
 
 This passage influences Reynolds to comment that, “the law of mind sets up certain 
correlations between ideas.”66 And he points out that it is the fact that there are asymmetric 
correlations between these ideas that the Law of Habit is really irreversible even though the law is a 
statistical one. In other words, Reynolds claims that while both the Law of Large Numbers and the 
Law of Habit are statistical, and so dynamically reversible, whereas the Law of Large Numbers would 
not rule out the possibility that certain past states could come about again, the Law of Habit is 
supposed to make this impossible.67 Reynolds follows David Dearmont’s account of Peirce’s Law of 
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Habit, whom Reynolds says “models the Law of Habit with what amounts to a nonstationary 
Markov chain.”68 In his paper, A Hint at Peirce’s Empirical Evidence for Tychism, Dearmont uses a 
computer model to analyze, as he understands it, Peirce’s Law of Habit. Dearmont does this by 
recreating the experiment envisioned by Peirce in  his essay “Design and Chance”. We need not go 
into detail over Dearmont’s computer model here. What matters is that as both Dearmont and 
Reynolds see Peirce’s Law of Habit, that law involves “an updating of the transition probabilities 
among types of events consequent on their occurring together in sequence.”69 Reynolds spells out 
his understanding of this process in more detail while raising the worry of the “incompatibility 
problem,” to which we now turn.  
 
III .  The Incompatibi l i ty  Problem 
 
With the above three sections in place, if I have succeeded in my explication, the reader is in a 
good position to notice the main problem. Reynolds begins his discussion of the incompatibility 
problem by guiding his reader toward understanding “the general effect that follows from the Law 
of Habit.”70 Here he makes the point mentioned above, that the Law of Habit is stochastic in nature 
and that it works to increase the probability, on any given occasion, that an object or type of 
phenomena will behave as it did previously. Reynolds and Dearmont interpret this to mean that the 
transition probabilities between event types as those types are exemplified sequentially through time. 
Reynolds says, “What the Law of Habit does, essentially, is to establish and strengthen correlations 
between events of certain general descriptions.”71 But this creates a problem.  
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According to what we saw above, Peirce wanted to be able to explain the evolution of the 
laws of nature in terms of Bernoulli’s law of large numbers. If he cannot get some account according 
to which the laws evolve out of chance processes, Peirce thinks he will have failed to explain the laws 
of nature at all, since in order to explain a regularity (e.g. a law of nature) it is not sufficient to simply 
postulate an absolute fact determining it. That way lies a blockade to inquiry. Genuine explanations 
do not make brute appeals to ontologically basic regularities.  Peirce must explain the evolution of 
regularities in terms of something which itself does not require an explanation, and this is, he thinks, 
chance. But chance will be able to do the trick, he thinks, because there are “laws” to chance: the 
Law of Large Numbers is one.72  
 
 Somehow, the Law of Large Numbers is supposed to accord with the Law of Habit. But, 
Reynolds objects, to say that the Law of Large Numbers applies is to require that the events or trials 
in question are both independent and identically distributed. Two events E1 and E2 are independent 
just in case the occurrence of either does not affect the probability of the occurrence of the other. 
And a series of events, E1, E2, …,EN are called identically distributed when the probability of each 
event in the series is constant, where this means that the probability Pr(E) of some event, E, 
occurring at time t is the same as Pr(E) at t’.73  
 
Each of these conditions on the Law of Large Numbers is apparently contradicted by the 
Law of Habit. For the Law of Habit, as understood according to Dearmont and Reynolds, stipulates 
that the transition probabilities between events get updated over time so that the probability of 
event type E occurring at t is not identical to the probability of the same event type occurring at t’. The 
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Law of Habit will work to increase this probability with each occurrence. So much for an identical 
distribution of events.  
 
The independence condition fares no better on this account. As Reynolds says, “The Law of 
Habit is precisely meant to establish regular causal connections between certain types of events.”74 
The events in the series cannot properly be independent from one another if the occurrence of one 
type of event impacts its own later occurrence. And yet, it would seem, in order to explain how laws 
of nature evolve, there need to be correlations between event types. Otherwise, Reynolds says, there 
could be no regular causal relationships at all, nor could there be any true lawlike generalizations 
such as “all As are Bs”. 
 
Concisely, the incompatibility problem is this: Peirce attempts to analyze the evolution of the 
laws of nature out of “absolute chance” by making use of both the Law of Large Numbers--which 
requires the chance events to be independent and identically distributed--and also the Law of Habit, 
which works by establishing connections between phenomena, thereby making them dependent 
upon one another in sequence. These look like mutually unsatisfiable conditions.  
 
 Reynolds is quick to note that this is a strange state of affairs, since Peirce himself was very 
aware that the independence condition needs to hold in order for the Law of Large Numbers to 
make sense.75 One possible way out of the problem for Peirce, Reynolds notes, is to say that he uses 
the word “chance” differently in different contexts: one mathematical and one metaphysical. But 
this seems like a highly implausible reading given that Peirce seems to think he is only using one 
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term the whole time. He says, for example, “when I speak of chance, I only employ a mathematical 
term to express with accuracy the characteristics of freedom or spontaneity”.76  
 
To make matters even worse, Reynolds is perhaps the first commentator to notice that for 
Peirce’s account of lawhood to make sense at the level of a population via the Law of Large 
Numbers, it has to already be assumed that the independent elements in the series whose joint 
actions determine a law are themselves already regular enough in their behaviour not to 
spontaneously change their natures or go out of existence. It is of no use to the statistician 
attempting to measure the overall trend of a fair coin if the coin sometimes comes up heads, 
sometimes tails, sometimes sideways, and sometimes spontaneously evaporates.77 In order to fix the 
behaviour of the elements or event types so that the Law of Large Numbers can apply, Peirce needs 
to rely on the Law of Habit at the level of individual members (whatever they may be). He cannot 
just stipulate this regular behaviour, however. Otherwise Peirce’s theory will run afoul of “blocking 
the road to inquiry” in precisely the way he thinks nominalism does, and his account of the 
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Chapter Two 
Parting of the Sensory 
 
 What follows is an overview of Peirce’s cosmology. Some of the ideas mentioned above 
involving continuity and chance will come into play. According to the relatively few scholars to 
focus on Peirce’s cosmology, the account given here is, I think, fairly uncontroversial, even if it is 
odd sounding to the contemporary ear. A fair warning to the reader: Peirce’s cosmology is sketchy 
and somewhat vague. It can seem unsavory to some folks to speculate seriously on a systematic 
metaphysics so thoroughly wedged within nineteenth century idealist fashions reminiscent (if not 
borrowed from or expanded upon) of Hegel and his ilk. This reservation is misplaced but 
understandable in light of contemporary fashions. Lest the reader be too worried, keep in mind that 
Peirce understood that his evolutionary cosmology sounded odd, and he developed what little he did 
regarding it because he thought that it could be presented in the form of a hypothesis that was 
capable of explaining the world we have and also that it could, at least in principle, be disproven. 
 
 Peirce thought that it was necessary to give an account of the origin of the universe in order 
to explain how laws and regularities in the universe came about. The project of metaphysics, he says, 
is to account for the whole universe of being, and in order to do this, the philosopher must assume a 
state antecedent to the existence of the universe.78 The cosmology that follows, then, begins at a 
consideration of this state of pure nothingness before the universe existed. Peirce is emphatic that 
this state of nothingness is not a state of “abstract being” but a state of nothing at all whatsoever. 
He considers the “nothing of negation” to be an insufficient analysis of this state, because to say that 
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something is not-A is to logically presuppose A itself, and the state of the universe prior to any 
existing being cannot assume this: 
 
  But this is not the nothing of negation. For not means other than, and other is merely a 
synonym of the ordinal numeral second. As such it implies a first; while the present pure zero 
[the state of nothingness being considered] is prior to every first.79 
 
 A quick note about some of Peirce’s terminology: I have previously neglected to speak of 
Peirce’s three categories, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. A full analysis of his categorical system 
would require far more than this work could begin to hope to accomplish, and besides this, Peirce’s 
categories are themselves somewhat oddly defined and used even by himself. He has the tendency to 
slip between several different definitions of the categories throughout his work that may or may not 
be equivalent. The categories are at once very useful and also somewhat obfuscatory depending on 
where and how Peirce employs them. Nevertheless, I will make reference to them as minimally as 
possible. Here is what the reader should know about them. The categories are intended to make 
sense of phenomenology, and they are best understood as relating to mental phenomena. They are, 
according to Peirce, fundamental and undeniable modes of cognizing the world. He thinks we are 
led to them through phenomenological inquiry and that each captures an aspect of our cognition 
required to make the world understandable and rational. Peirce identifies Firstness with possibility, 
quality, and spontaneity; Secondness with existence or brute fact, heccaeity, and the “here-nowness” 
of events and objects; and Thirdness with mediation, law (in the non-rigid statistical sense), 
tendency, disposition, habit, relationality, generality, and continuity.  
 
 Given this, it is important to take note of the fact that Peirce draws a distinction between 
reality and existence. Reality, for him, is what cannot be denied come what may. It consists in being 
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what an indefinite community of inquiring minds would, in the infinite long run, agree upon. The 
subjunctive is important here. It is not just whatever will actually get discovered in the future; it is 
what would get discovered if an indefinite amount of scientific inquiry were done. This definition 
falls directly out of Peirce’s lifelong commitment to the pragmatic maxim of 1878, which says to 
“Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of 
our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the 
object.”80 I say it falls directly out, though it does not obviously do so. There is some question about 
what the “practical effects” are supposed to be, but there is general agreement that Peirce 
understood this to mean the upshot of scientific scrutiny, at least by the time he was working on his 
cosmology.,81 
 
 Existence is a slightly different matter. Whereas reality is understood to be what cannot be 
denied, existence is a mode of being that meets both the condition of undeniability and also is such 
as to involve Secondness. Peirce often speaks of existing things as having a kind of resistance or 
hardness to them. Existence involves a thing being related to another thing so as to react with it. My 
office chair exists because I can sit in it. It’s the kind of thing that I can bump up against. I cannot 
deny its reality because I cannot deny its existence. I cannot deny that it exists because it is related to me 
in a certain way--it resists me. There is a reaction I have with it. Reaction is precisely the mode of 
Secondness by Peirce’s lights. Compare this with the mode of being that things like laws or real 
relations have. They are not best understood in terms of secondness but thirdness; you don’t take a 




 It appears that misunderstandings on this point due to William James and others were what led Peirce 
to change the name of “pragmatism” to “pragmaticism” which is “a name ugly enough to be secure from 
kidnappers” EP2: 335 
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walk in the woods and trip over a pile of laws, nor are you ever bumped into by the taller-than 
relation.82 
 
 When Peirce says, then, that the state of the universe prior to any existence is prior to any 
Firsts, what he means is twofold. First, the universe at this stage is a nothingness devoid even of 
qualities or possibilities, i.e. Firsts or things understandable in terms purely of Firstness, if we want 
to be careful. Second, since there are no Firsts, there can be no reactions between them, so the 
universe cannot properly be said to exist either. For clarity, it will help to get an idea of what 
Firstness is. In “The Universal Categories” Peirce describes his three categories of thought, and he 
talks about the category of Firstness as being “Quality of Feeling, or whatever is such as it is 
positively and regardless of aught else.”83 Later, in “Objective Logic”, he identifies the world of 
Firstness with the realm of qualia. A First is a quale. It is a specific determination of a possible object 
of consciousness. “Each quale is in itself what it is for itself, without reference to any other.”84 In 
“The Logic of Continuity” Peirce also calls Firsts, or qualia, “sense-qualities”, and he identifies them 
with real possibilities or potentialities.85 It is a bit odd to make this move, since usually Peirce makes 
potentiality/possibility the realm of Thirdness. It will become clearer later why he makes this move, 
but for now, it is worth noting that Peirce believes all three categories are equally important and 
inextricably linked. As I understand it, the whole point of “The Architecture of Theories” and 
“Seven Systems of Metaphysics” is to show that only a world consisting of all three categories of 
thought can make sense of our phenomenology, and these three categories are not capable of being 
completely abstracted from one another. I will later suggest that Peirce may mean two things by 
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“quality” or “First”. We can think of them, on the one hand, as being like transcendent universals 
(perhaps they really are universals) which are never fully instantiated.86 They are potentialities for their 
own instantiation. On the other hand, any specific instantiation of a universal/quality is also called a 
sense-quality, first, or quale. Now, back to the beginning of the universe. 
 
 Despite his insisting that the state of nothingness prior to the universe was not a state of 
mere “abstract being,” Peirce says only a few paragraphs later that “of potential being there was in 
that initial state no lack.”87 He says that the nothing in question is not the “nothing of death” but the 
“nothing of not having been born...in which the whole universe is involved and foreshadowed.”88 
The nothingness, or “nullity” involved is not merely simple negation, since negation implies 
something to be negated, but less than reality, since it is prior even to real qualitative possibilities 
(Firsts). This state Peirce identifies as being in general: “In the beginning was nullity, or absolute 
indetermination, which, considered as the possibility of all determination, is being.”89 He says in 
other places that “pure being is blank nothingness”. Strictly speaking, Peirce says that we cannot conceive 
of this state of nullity, but we can still talk about it in a vague way.90 He says that in the state of 
nullity, “there must then have been a tohu bohu of which nothing whatever affirmative or negative 
was true universally. There must have been, therefore, a little of everything conceivable.”91 
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 The state of nullity prior to the creation of the universe, then, can be vaguely understood as 
a state of pure potentiality, wherein every possible qualitative possibility was undifferentiated.92 It is a 
nothingness consisting of not only the absence of any existing thing, since there are no reactions, 
but even the absence of any determinate possibilities, where possibilities are understood as ways a 
thing might be i.e. qualities, properties, or relations. This realm of pure nullity is the general possibility 
for possibilities. As such, it is completely vague and indeterminate. What arises out of this state of 
nullity is a “cosmos of sense qualities” or qualitative possibilities, i.e. Firsts.93 Peirce candidly refers 
to this resulting state as the world of forms: 
 
  The evolution of forms begins, or at any rate, has for an early stage of it, a vague 
potentiality; and that either is or is followed by a continuum of forms having a multitude of 
dimensions too great for the individual dimensions to be distinct. It must be  by a contraction 
of the vagueness of that potentiality of everything in general but of nothing in particular that 
the world of forms comes about.94 
  
 This passage is taken from the lecture “The Logic of Continuity” of 1898, and it is worth 
noting what Peirce means here by “continuum”. For Peirce, a true continuum is prior to any of its 
parts. It is, therefore, impossible to construct a continuum out of separate elements. Peirce rejects 
the idea that any number of points, however large, could come to form the continuity involved in a 
straight line, for example.95 For him, a point on a line is secondary to the line itself, which forms a 
true continuum, since its number of possible points exceeds any given cardinality. With this in mind, 
we can see that in the passage above, Peirce is saying that the “world of forms” comprises a 
continuum much in the way that the points on a line do; that is, there are possible designations but 
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prior to their being designated they are not differentiated from one another. I suggest that this 
continuum of possible “forms”, or qualitative possibilities, is itself just the “tohu bohu” or nullity 
spoken of above. Just as in a continuous line the points are indistinct and vague so as to be welded 
together and not individuated so that they cannot be said to exist (in Peirce’s sense), so the 
continuum of qualities, or world of forms, is a continuity prior to the determination of any possible 
given quality.  
 
Notice, however, that in the passage above, Peirce is describing how the world of forms itself 
comes about, so there is some clarification to be made here. He says that the vague potentiality 
(nullity) “either is or is followed by a continuum of forms.” This passage is one of several in which 
Peirce slips between talking about the state of nullity and what he calls the primeval chaos. In some 
places, Peirce implies that the state of nothingness just is the primeval chaos, for instance when he 
says, “The chaos is a state of intensest feeling [Peirce identifies qualities with feelings], although, 
memory and habit being totally absent, it is sheer nothing still.”96 And he says in “Man’s Glassy 
Essence” that “[The] primeval chaos in which there was no regularity was mere nothing...Yet it was 
not a blank zero; for there was an intensity of consciousness there….”97 In other passages, Peirce 
seems to identify nullity with the world of forms only insofar as that world is potential. That is, he 
seems to leave room for entirely different worlds of forms coming about. He says, for example: 
 
I do not mean that potentiality immediately results in actuality...but what immediately 
resulted was that unbounded potentiality [the state of nothingness] became potentiality of this 
or that sort--that is, of some quality.  




 6.265. What Peirce means by “consciousness” is simply pure qualities or firsts, which he thinks of as 
involving sentience. It is unlikely that he intended to mean any sort of self-reflexive or intensional sense of 
consciousness. 6.221 
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  The very first and most fundamental element that we have to assume is a Freedom, 
or Chance, or Spontaneity, by virtue of which the general vague nothing-in-particular-ness that 
preceded the chaos took a thousand definite qualities.99 
  
 It is not clear if these passages are really contradicting each other, since it is not obvious that 
the “blank zero” of 6.265 is intended to be the same thing as the “zero of bare possibility” of 6.220, 
although the last passage does certainly seem to favor the reading that nullity is a state prior to the 
world of forms. However, it is pretty clear that Peirce only conceived of the state of nothingness as a 
hypothetical ideal state that we have to postulate in order to explain the emergence of law in the 
universe and that this state is prior to time.100 I suggest that Peirce means two different things by the 
“nothing” of the early universe. First is the nothing involved in the possibility of a world of forms, i.e. 
a realm of eternal qualities or “eternal possibilities”101 and second is the nothing involved in 
considering the realm of qualities itself, which being a world of Firsts cannot be said to exist and is in 
that sense “nothing”. In any case, it does not seem to me that this issue impacts my interpretation of 
the law of habit. 
 
 One thing that should be flagged now, however, is that whatever the state of nothingness is, 
Peirce is emphatic that it involves real potentiality. The sense in which nothingness makes it possible 
for qualitative possibilities to be differentiated from the continuum (whatever it is) is one that 
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involves some metaphysical, not merely logical, sense of possibility.102 Peirce says that “the word 
‘potential’ means indeterminate yet capable of determination in any special case,”103 and he is clear in several 
places that the “logic of freedom, or potentiality, is that it shall annul itself. For if it does not annul 
itself, it remain a completely idle and do-nothing potentiality; and a completely idle potentiality is 
annulled by its complete idleness.”104 There is some sense in which the nullity prior to the existing 
universe (and perhaps the cosmos of qualities) consists in a tendency for a realization, though not a 
realization of any particular kind.105 
 
 Out of the state of nothingness arises a world of pure qualities, or Firsts, in the form of real 
potentialities or possibilities. These arise by chance, in the sense that nothing determines that this or 
that quality will arise, but Peirce thinks that something must arise out of the state of nothingness, 
because, the nothingness being wholly vague, has nothing to prevent the coming into reality of any 
given “form”or real quality. Speaking of this, Peirce says: 
 
 We can hardly but suppose that those sense-qualities that we now experience, colors, 
odors, sounds, feelings of every description, loves, griefs, surprise, are but the relics of an 
ancient ruined continuum of qualities, like a few columns standing here and there in testimony 
that here some old-word forum with its basilica and temples had once made a magnificent 
ensemble. And just as that forum, before it was actually built, had had a vague under-existence in 
the mind of him who planned its construction, so too the cosmos of sense qualities...had in an 
antecedent stage of development a vaguer being, before the relations of its dimensions became 
definite and contracted.106 
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 Here we can see the emergence of a world of forms out of the vague nothingness that Peirce 
talks about. In another passage, he says that the process whereby the indefinite possibility of 
qualities springs into reality took the form of a hypothetic inference of the form: 
 
  Something is possible, 
  Red is something; 
  [therefore,] Red is possible.107 
 
 We are forced to attempt to understand this process as being prior to time, since Peirce 
explicitly says that it is a logical and not temporal “process”.108 In any case, Peirce thinks of this first 
emergence from the general state of “nothing-in-particular-ness” involves a springing up of a 
continuum of qualities, which are “mere potentialities”109 or “mere eternal possibilities.”110 As Paul 
Forster puts it, “The first stage in the evolution of being, according to Peirce, is the development of 
more or less definite qualities or dimensions along which things might possibly vary or be 
distinguished.”111 Peirce tells us that this continuum of qualitative possibilities comes about by 
chance or spontaneity.112 But this continuum of qualities is not such that it was created by this or 
that quality springing into existence by chance and then coming into relation afterward. Instead, 
Peirce tells us that “The general indefinite potentiality became limited and heterogeneous,”113 so that 
the qualities “spring up in reaction upon one another”.114 By doing so, they spring into a “kind of 
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existence”.115 This can seem to be at odds with what was said earlier about the difference between 
reality and existence, especially if Peirce says in one place that the world of forms is real but does not 
exist, whereas now he is saying that it does exist. It is telling, however, that Peirce says the qualities 
come into a kind of existence. He says in the same paper, “We shall naturally suppose, of course, 
that existence is a stage of evolution. This existence is presumably but a special existence.”116 It looks 
like what he might have in mind is that existence is not univocal.117 It comes in various kinds and 
degrees.118  This is further evidenced by his claims that, “the existing universe...is an offshoot from, 
or an arbitrary determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world,”119 and “if we are going to regard 
the universe as a result of evolution at all, we must think that not merely the existing universe, that 
locus in the cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the whole Platonic world, which in itself is 
equally real, is evolutionary in its origin too.”120 
 
 I have emphasized two points of this last quote. First, Peirce speaks of the cosmos as if it 
were one thing of which our existing universe is a mere part. Second, he suggests that our actual 
universe is just a small subset of the real existing cosmos, which involves reactions between various 
qualities. This supports a reading according to which reactions between qualities in the actual 
universe are limited, but the whole world of forms should be understood as continually reacting 
against itself. This is further evidenced by his claim that, “We need not suppose that every form 
needs for its evolution to emerge into this world, but only that it needs to enter into some theatre of 
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reactions, of which this is one.”121 This should not be understood to undermine Peirce’s claim that 
the qualities that comprise the world of forms are any less general or potential in their nature. They 
are still real eternal possibilities, according to him, even though the cosmos that they comprise now 
“exists” as they react against one another. This certainly seems a bit obscure, but I suggest that this 
is why Peirce draws a distinction (at least implicitly, given his consistent use of the terms) between a 
quality’s being differentiated from the continuum and its being determined. As he uses the terms, for a 
quality to be differentiated from the continuum is just for it to be possible that there can be 
determinations of that quality alone, where a determination of that quality involves a specific picking 
out of it, much like the designation of a point on a line, which occurs when that quality interacts 
with another. The nothingness prior to the world of forms is not even differentiated; it is possible 
that there are possible qualities, but even those are indistinct as definite possibilities. Once the 
“vagueness” of the nothingness “contracts” (as Peirce says), the world of forms is brought about, 
which consists in a totality of definite possible qualities. These definite qualities can interact, but we 
shouldn’t think of them as interacting all at once, so to speak. For any given quality, Peirce thinks 
there are a non-denumerable number of instances that quality could take; it is not as though, when 
the qualities react, every possible instance of their potential being are reacting or related. The 
qualities are only partially determinate.122 It looks like Peirce is suggesting that when the world of 
forms comes about, it automatically does so by various qualities reacting in partial ways. Otherwise, 
he says, they could not be united into a continuum.123 Peirce clearly states that in and of themselves, 
the qualities are “mere eternal possibilities” but that the reactions between qualities should be 
thought of as (non-temporal) events.124 These qualities and events spring up together, and in order 
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for the universe to grow and evolve, chance determinations of the qualities must be constantly 
arising.125 Although Peirce does not say it this way explicitly, I suggest that for Peirce, the partial 
determination of a quality as it reacts with another is just what contemporary philosophers would 
call property instantiation.126  
 
 Once chance determinations of qualities begin, Peirce says that in order for them to not go 
out of existence, they must acquire habits. Habits, he thinks, are generalizing tendencies for various 
property instantiations to go together.  Moreover, since the process of qualities coming into relation 
or reaction against one another is a chance affair, without a principle of habit, there would be 
nothing to keep these existences around. Peirce likens the reactive coming into relation of qualities 
to “a flash”.127 This flash of an existence is a chance coming to be of a reaction between two 
qualities. But if it does not have with it a tendency to stick around so as to be able to interact with 
further chance existences, then it will simply go out of existence.128 In “The Logic of Continuity” 
Peirce makes an analogy to the birth of the cosmos by using a blackboard to represent the 
continuum of possibilities.129 Drawing a line on the blackboard, Peirce says that the white chalk line 
(which he subsequently notes is actually an oval) represents the chance determination of a possible 
quality. The white chalk line is a continuity itself, and it gets its continuity from the continuum prior 
to it, the blackboard on which it was drawn. Peirce notes that there is now a discontinuity in the 
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129
 He is unclear as to whether he intends the chalk board to represent the original state of nullity or the 
world of forms insofar as it is prior to any determination within it: “The blackboard is a continuum of 
possible points; while [what it represents] is a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or is a 
continuum of possible dimensions of a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or something of that 
sort.” (6.203) 
  62 
continuum between the blackboard itself and the chalk. This is the boundary region between the 
white of the chalk and the black of the board. He says: 
 
[T]he discontinuity can only be produced upon that blackboard by the reaction 
between two continuous surfaces into which it is separated, the white surface and the black 
surface. The whiteness is a Firstness--a springing up of something new. But the boundary 
between the black and white is neither black, nor white, nor neither, nor both. It is the 
pairedness of the two. It is for the white the active Secondness of the black; for the black the 
active Secondness of the white.130 
 
 This “pairedness” or discontinuity in the continuum is a flash of existence--a brute reaction 
between qualities. But Peirce says that the line is a mere accident, and only if the white chalk has a 
tendency to stay around for a while will it be possible for it to interact with further lines. He 
proceeds to draw further lines, and notes how a new line can be formed by drawing intersecting 
lines tangentially to one another (the points where the lines intersect together form a new curved 
line, and eventually an elliptical shape). This process whereby some reactions between qualities tend 
to stick around and interact with further qualities or reactions is what constitutes a habit for those 
qualities. Peirce says that we can come to see that the individual lines, or “flashes” of existence, will 
slowly lose their individual identity as they interact and are subsumed into the new line.  
 
 Peirce is convinced that the world is chock full of habits, and part of the reason he thinks 
this is because, according to him, the existence of real objects consists in their having regular 
behaviors.131 To this extent, even the first stages of evolution wherein qualities are reacting cannot 




 1.411: “The existence of things consists in their regular behavior. If an atom had no regular attractions 
and repulsions, if its mass was at one instant nothing, at another a ton, at another a negative 
quantity...such a disjointed plurality of phenomena would not make up any existing thing.” 
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be said to really exist unless there are habits or tendencies for regular behavior present.132 But once 
habits are present, the world comes into proper existence, and it is possible for systems of reacting 
qualities to be produced and to evolve over time. This evolution would be driven by the various 
habits or tendencies of objects to behave regularly in conjunction with the general tendency of the 
universe to produce habits. This latter tendency is what Peirce calls the law of habit. The law of 
habit, being itself a tendency, must be such as to increase its own power over time, he thinks.133  
 
 From the law of habit, which he suggests started as a chance offshoot of the primeval chaos 
as a “germ” of lawfulness134, Peirce thinks all the laws of nature will eventually evolve. In “A Guess 
at the Riddle”, Peirce suggests that all the laws of nature evolved out of habits, which have been 
strengthened over time by the law of habit itself. I will have much more to say about this process  in 
the next chapter. We should be careful here to note, as we did earlier, that Peirce sometimes slips 
between two senses of “law”. Strictly speaking, Peirce does not think the laws of physics are exact, 
even though he says such things as, “the laws of physics know nothing of tendencies or 
probabilities; whatever they require at all they require absolutely and without fail, and they are never 
disobeyed.”135 In the passage from which that quote is taken, Peirce is referring to the mathematical 
understanding of laws of nature, assuming that they are, in fact, precise. But on numerous occasions, 
he says that we have no good reason to think the laws of nature are presently exact in this way. 
According to him, the laws of nature evolved over time by the principle of habit-taking, or as a 
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result of the law of habit.136 He further suggests that the laws of nature essentially involve regularities 
of underlying phenomena such as substances, which themselves come about by habit-formation: 
 
 [In the early universe] pairs of states will also begin to take habits, and thus each state 
having different habits with reference to the different other states will give rise to bundles of 
habits, which will be substances. Some of these states will chance to take habits of 
persistencey, and will get to be less and less liable to disappear; while those that fail to take 
such habits will fall out of existence. Thus, substances will get to be permanent. 
 In fact, habits, from the mode of their formulation, necessarily consist in the 
permanence of some relation, and therefore, on this theory, each law of nature would consist 
in some permanence, such as permanence of mass, momentum, and energy.137 
 
 Peirce may wish to identify laws of nature with real powers or dispositions that result from 
phenomena taking habits or possessing tendencies toward definite regular behavior, a fact which 
gains additional support from his analysis of the role of chance in the production of uniformities as 
he discusses in his lecture “Causation and Force.”138 Here he says that although he has said that a 
uniformity “or regular law” can result from a “fortuitous distribution”, this uniformity can only arise 
if there are already regularities in whatever phenomena the uniformity or law is a uniformity of: 
 
 Take, for example, Boyle’s law that if the density of a gas is doubled its pressure will 
be exactly doubled. This is because if there are twice as many molecules in the space, twice 
as many in a given time will pound upon the wall of the receptacle. But this results not from 
fortuitous distribution alone, but from fortuitous distribution conjoined with the 
circumstance that the paths of the molecules are all very nearly rectilinear...Now this is 
something which, being true of all the molecules, is a regularity. The simplicity of the law is 
due to the simplicity of this regularity.139 
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 Peirce goes on to say that “law begets law; and chance begets chance,” so that laws of nature 
must come about by being statistical combinations of underlying regularities. These regularities he 
speaks of are, I think, just the various habits that chance instantiations of qualities eventually take.  
 
 Unfortunately, in the major passages wherein Peirce explains his cosmology, such as “A 
Guess at the Riddle”, “The Logic of Continuity”, and “The Logic of Events”, he leaves much to be 
desired with respect to explaining exactly how it is that habits themselves are formed or evolved out 
of either the continuum of nullity or the world of forms. He hints that his law of habit is the 
explanation, but all this appears to amount to is the claim that once qualities are differentiated from 
the continuum, and once those qualities begin to interact, there will be a tendency toward “habit-
taking” for various events or instantiations of qualities and that things will begin to become regular, 
even though there will be many chance departures from the regularities. In “The Logic of 
Continuity” where Peirce illustrates his evolutionary cosmology with the analogy of the blackboard, 
he says that only once things begin to take habits can they stick around and interact and so really 
exist. These habits give chance occurrences an “incipient staying quality, some tendency toward 
consistency”.  Furthermore,  
 
 This habit is a generalizing tendency, and as such a generalization, and as such a 
general, and as such a continuum or continuity. It must have its origin in the original 
continuity which is inherent in potentiality. Continuity, as generality, is inherent in 
potentiality, which is essentially general.140 
 
 
 Somehow or other, habits must spring from the original continuum as well, and once they 
do, the tendency for the universe to take habits will, along with chance occurrences, go on to 
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produce new habits and, eventually, laws of nature.141 But exactly how this process is to occur Peirce 
leaves to the reader to glean from other writings, and even then he only gives hints. We will return 
to this in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
A Magnificent Ensemble 
 
 In the first chapter we saw that there is a tension between the Law of Large Numbers and 
the law of habit in Peirce’s account of evolutionary cosmology and more specifically his account of 
the evolution of laws of nature. The problem is that laws of nature are supposed to evolve out of 
pure chance and so must involve the Law of Large Numbers, which, being a formal mathematical 
result, does not presuppose lawhood or regularity; at the same time,  laws are supposed to develop 
by taking habits, which work to connect types of events together in a way that violates the 
conditions of independence and identical distribution required for the Law of Large Numbers to 
work. Andrew Reynolds calls this tension the “incompatibility problem”.  
 
We also saw that Reynolds raises another problem: that for the Law of Large Numbers to 
work in the first place, the objects going into the calculation have to be somewhat stable.142 If I flip a 
coin, I expect it to come up either heads or tails. I don’t expect it to turn into a puddle of coffee 
spontaneously. It appears, then, that Peirce must assume the very regularities he is trying to explain 
when making use of the Law of Large Numbers as an explanation of the regularities we find in 
nature, including laws.  
 
 I believe these problems are solvable for Peirce. The solution requires taking a different 
interpretation of the law of habit than Reynolds takes. As mentioned earlier, Reynolds, following 
Dearmont, suggests that Peirce intended the law of habit to function as a non-stationary Markov 
chain where the transition probabilities between event types get updated over time. This reading of 
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the law of habit is a very natural one, especially given the passage Reynolds (and Dearmont) appeals 
to as the basis for it: 
 
 [A]ll things have a tendency to take habits. For atoms and their parts, molecules, and 
groups of molecules, and in short every conceivable real object, there is a greater probability 
of acting on a former like occasion than otherwise.143 
 
 If this passage is taken alone to be the key to elucidating the law of habit, then there is a 
serious risk of misapplying the role the law of habit is supposed to play in Peirce’s cosmology, which 
I argue is mostly explanatory. Specifically, while it is true that the law of habit will turn out to be an 
operative principle at every level of nature, I hold that the reason Peirce postulates it is first and 
foremost to explain the emergence of law and regularity in the universe in general rather than to 
explain the various stabilities of atoms, molecules, and the like. The stability of these phenomena is a 
correlative consequence of the application of the law at a much more universal description. In other 
words, whereas Reynolds and Dearmont make the case that the role of the law of habit is to 
establish correlations between various types of phenomena in nature, I hold that Peirce need not be 
committed to this, and that he can appeal to the law of habit to explain why the universe contains 
certain kinds or types of habits or tendencies in the first place, as opposed to others. In conjunction 
with Peirce’s thesis of tychism and his definition of existence, which has a special meaning for him 
according to which a thing can only properly be said to exist when it is in relation to something else, 
the law of habit gives us what we need to understand why it is true that there is a “greater probability 
of acting as on a former like occasion than otherwise” for any given phenomenon without acting 
like some mysterious force that updates the transition probabilities between event types when those 
types are instantiated.  
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 Here’s the plan for the rest of the chapter. 
 
 I will suggest an interpretation of the law of habit which involves the following notions.  
(1) The universe contains tendencies, or what contemporary metaphysicians call dispositional 
properties as a basic ingredient.  
(2) These properties can be understood statistically--they can combine with each other to form 
further tendencies which are themselves understandable statistically, and existing objects just consist 
in bundles of dispositional properties. 
 (3) Dispositional properties (or tendencies or habits, etc.) are understandable in terms of limit 
frequencies given by the Law of Large Numbers such that tendencies just are the statistical 
uniformities that would result given an indefinite application of the Law of Large Numbers to 
instantiations of the tendencies themselves.  
 
And finally,  
 
(4) the law of habit is itself a tendency (Peirce says as much) understandable in terms of the above 
criteria. This last point opens up room for explaining what it means for the law of habit to be 
operative at a universal scale. It also, conveniently, provides an explanation for why event types of 
the kind Reynolds mentions remain stable over time (so that we do not get problems such as dice 
spontaneously disappearing when we flip them).  
 
 After this, I will provide a summary of Peirce’s cosmology in light of my interpretation, and I 
will return to the incompatibility problem in order to make it clear how the above interpretation 
solves it. We will also take a look at the other problem regarding the stability of properties over time.  
  70 
I . An Interpretat ion 
 
 The overview of the cosmology given in the second chapter is, I think, relatively standard 
fare, at least among the small number of scholars who study it. I have tried very hard not to say 
anything in the above section that would be too contentious--that is, given what Peirce himself says, 
which is contentious enough by itself. But as noted already, it is an unfortunate fact of Peirce’s 
writing on these topics that he never in one place gives a very satisfactory account of the nature of 
habits, the tendency to take habits (the law of habit), or the production (differentiation?) of habits 
out of the original continuum of nullity. To be sure, he seems to think his ideas are obviously 
contained in such works as “The Law of Mind”, “The Laws of Nature”, and “Habits”, but it is, after 
all, not so easy as this. This is partly due to the way that Peirce draws together various ideas from 
psychology, physics, mathematics, logic, and chemistry to talk about these issues.144 In his mind, he 
is revealing an overarching principle, but it is often confusing and leaves the reader somewhat lost. 
Just when things get interesting in a physical case, for example, he will start talking about psychology 
and protoplasm, leaving it to the reader to work out the physical details by analogy, something that 
is difficult if not impossible to do without all the resources Peirce himself had.  
 
 In light of this, I will try for an interpretation that strings together various hints and 
glimmers from both the texts we have seen thus far as well as from additional manuscripts. 
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Fortunately, Peirce gives little nuggets here and there which will, I think, be quite useful in this 
endeavor.  
 
 Here are the important claims that I will make: 
 
(1)  Peirce identifies (or should identify) tendencies with statistical uniformities that would obtain 
in the indefinite long run.  
(2)  What Peirce means by “habits” are much like the dispositional properties of contemporary 
metaphysics. As such, they are like qualities that can arise by chance out of the continuum. The 
difference is that they require actual instantiations of qualities in order to apply to anything. 
(3) The Law of Large Numbers is a purely formal law, and its role in Peirce’s metaphysics is to 
make understandable the nature of a tendency, not to produce one. It tells us what a tendency is if we 
were to measure instances where that tendency is operative. 
(4) The law of habit, being a tendency, need not be intended to explain how tendencies 
themselves either arise or get strengthened. It is intended to explain why certain tendencies stick 
around and others do not. It explains why the world, as a whole, is regular. In a certain respect, the 
Law of Habit just is the Law of Large Numbers applied to the various property instantiations in the 
universe as a whole. 
 
 Before going on, let’s summarize what has been said about the cosmology so far. First, 
Peirce postulates that in the beginning there was a state of nullity that had its being only potentially. 
This state was a kind of pure potentiality consisting of all possible determinations of quality before 
such qualities were even differentiated as distinct possibilities. This potentiality, furthermore, 
required that something, but nothing specifically, arise out of it--namely some realm of qualities 
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would have to be produced, or else it would not be a real potentiality. There is some sense in which 
the state of nullity is like a massive tendency itself, but if so it is simply the tendency for something in 
general not any particular thing or collection of things. Out of this state of nullity arises a realm of 
qualities, which are real possibilities capable of determination in particular cases. These qualities 
interact against one another by chance, and these interactions form a collection of distinct 
existences. Eventually, habits are formed between existences so that they stick around and can 
evolve. This last stage, or some subsequent similar process, marks the coming into existence of the 
actual world. The actual world continues to evolve as chance qualities are differentiated and 
instantiated over time; qualities interact, and tendencies between qualities compete so as to make 
probable or improbable further higher order tendencies or bundles of habits. The laws of nature 
grow and evolve as relations between tendencies or habits.  
 
 Let’s begin with the first point above. This section is intended to make a little clearer what 
habits are and how they go about producing regularities. Here is a suggestion: I maintain that Peirce 
either thought that habits are or are understandable in terms of statistical uniformities that would 
arise in the long run. That is, they are statistical uniformities of the various instantiations over which 
they range. Suppose, for example, that there is a habit or tendency for some quality, say red, to go 
together with some other, circularity, for example. Then the habit consists in the statistical 
uniformity that would result in the long run if compresent instantiations of these properties were 
randomly measured. There is some textual evidence to back this up. In “Notes on The Doctrine of 
Chances”, Peirce discusses his notion of probability, and he uses the example of a die having a one-
third probability of coming up on a number divisible by three. He tells us that to say that a die really 
has such a probability of doing so, is to think that the die has a certain habit or tendency for this 
behavior. 
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I am, then, to define the meanings of the statement that the probability, that if a die be 
thrown from a dice box it will turn up a number divisible by three, is one-third. The statement 
means that the die has a certain “would-be”; and to say that a die has a “would-be” is to say that it 
has a property, quite analogous to any habit that a man might have. Only the “would-be” of the die 
is presumably as much simpler and more definite than the man’s habit as the die’s homogeneous 
composition and cubical shape is simpler than the nature of the man’s nervous system and soul. And 
just as it would be necessary, in order to define a man’s habit, to describe how it would lead him to 
behave and upon what sort of occasion--albeit this statement would by no means imply that the 
habit consists in that action--so to define the die’s “would-be,” it is necessary to say how it would 
lead the die to behave on an occasion that would bring out the full consequence of the “would-be”; 
and this statement will not of itself imply that the “would-be” of the die consists in such 
behavior.145  
 
 I have quoted Peirce at length because there are several important things to recognize about 
this passage. In the first place, Peirce is telling us that a die’s behavior is governed by a habit, which 
is statistical in nature. Second, he means to make clear that the habit itself cannot consist in the sum 
total of what the die actually does. The “would-be” of the die involves how the die would behave in 
the long run, but it cannot be made up of any actual number of throws. This notion is close to the 
heart of Peirce’s theory of generality itself; he thinks that what is possible far outstrips what ever 
could be actualized. And since a tendency or habit is a real potentiality, the “would-be” of the die 
cannot simply consist in its actual behavior. However, it can be defined by its behavior: 
 
 To get back, then, to the die and its habit--it’s “would-be”--I really know of no other 
way of defining a habit than by describing the kind of behavior in which the habit becomes 
actualized. So I am obliged to define the statement that there is a probability of one-third 
that the die when thrown will turn up either a three or a six by stating how the numbers will 
run when the die is thrown.146 
 
 What, then, constitutes a habit? Here Peirce gives a brief thought experiment. He says that 
we cannot come to know for absolute certain that the die has a particular character after an endless 
series of throws, because we can imagine a situation in which we run an endless experiment that gets 
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interrupted and resumed wherein whenever we roll the die it comes up a six, but during the time of 
interruption, when some friends have it, it behaves just like an ordinary die. What he says next, 
however, is quite revealing: 
 
 I say it might, in the sense that it would not violate the principle of contradiction if 
it did. It sanely would not, however, unless a miracle were performed; and moreover if such 
a miracle were worked, I should say...that during this experimental series of throws, the die 
took on an abnormal, a miraculous, habit. For I should think that the performance of a 
certain line of behavior, throughout an endless succession of occasions, without exception, 
very decidedly constituted a habit.147  
 
 Notice that Peirce thinks either kind of behavior--whether the die turned up a six every time 
indefinitely, or whether it behaved like an ordinary die--counts as a habit. This suggests that when he 
says that perfectly regular behavior “decidedly constitute[s]” a habit, we should understand this as a 
sufficient but not necessary condition. For otherwise, we will have to give an account of what it 
means for a die to behave in the ordinary way, which is statistical, throughout an “endless succession 
of occasions, without exception”. It’s not clear what it would mean for a die to come up six with a 
probability one-sixth “without exception”, unless all that is meant by this is that such is the statistical 
uniformity that would result in the indefinite long run. If that is what is intended, all the better for 
my interpretation, however.  
 
 Nevertheless, I think if we look to a few other sources, we can gather together enough 
evidence that habits just are statistical uniformities that would hold true in the long run. Consider, 
for example, that Peirce says that laws of nature are “prognostic generalizations of observations”.148 
They are generalities, and so involve possible instantiations that exceed any possible multitude of 
                                                
147
 2.667, emphasis original 
148
 EP2, 68 
  75 
instances.149 That is, a law of nature concerns not just what will be the case but what would be the 
case; it is a “would-be” and so a habit. In “Design and Chance,” Peirce says that he supposes all the 
laws of nature to be “statistical results”: 
 
 Now when we take into account that feature of chance which I have been bringing 
to your notice, we find that this agent, although it can only work upon the basis of some law 
or uniformity, or more or less definite ratio toward uniformity, has the property of being 
able to produce uniformities far more strict than those from which it works.  
 It is therefore possible to suppose that not only the laws of chemistry but other 
known laws of matter are statistical results.150 
 
And later in the same work: 
 
 [T]he formation of habits could be accounted for by the principles of probability, 
 
Finally, we have an interesting clue given in the plan for a lecture: 
 
The law of high numbers. Important consequences of certain numbers being large in 
different branches of science; such as political economy, theory of gasses, physiology, 
doctrine of natural selection, and wherever there is a tendency toward an end.151 
 
 One might object that this does not prove my case but at best shows that some habits are 
statistical, since the evidence given this far shows that being a law of nature is sufficient for being a 
habit and that laws of nature are statistical, but it does not show that all habits are statistical results. 
A few things can be said here. First, it seems unlikely to me that Peirce would want to divide his 
account of tendencies and laws into this sort of bifurcation. His principle of continuity or synechism 
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flatly rejects dualities of that kind as a general rule.152 Secondly, the above passages, taken together, 
still seem to make the view plausible to some degree. And third, the merits of this reading will be 
measured by their theoretical utility, which I hope will help to make sense of Peirce’s overall project.  
 
 More can be said of habits, however, than that they consist in statistical uniformities that 
would result in the long run. That certainly seems to characterize them as “would-be’s”, but it does 
little to explicate their origin. Recall that this is where things get weird in the cosmology that Peirce 
offers. When he gives his account of the development of the early universe, which he gives in some 
detail in three distinct places,153 he gives us very little to go on with respect to what habits are or how 
they come about.  
 
This brings us to (2) above. As I see it, there is nothing contradictory about holding both 
that the tendencies or habits in the universe are statistical uniformities and also that they are 
dispositional properties. These may just be two ways of looking at the same thing. To say that a 
tendency is a statistical uniformity that would result after an indefinite amount of time--that is, via 
Peirce’s theory of inquiry, they are realities that the indefinite community of scientifically led minds 
would come to agree upon as realities--is just to say that there are realities in nature which are 
disposed to realize themselves in certain ways. There can be different kinds of statistical uniformities, 
after all. 
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 I suggest that we interpret Peirce to be saying that among the possible qualities that may get 
differentiated from the primordial continuum are various dispositional properties. These will be 
“mere eternal possibilities” in the same way that all qualities are, with the main difference (if there 
even is a difference)154 being that dispositional qualities, as real potentialities that act as general 
predicates, logically require their subjects. Their having to do so does not imply that they have to do 
it in any particular way, of course. That would destroy the whole notion of their being dispositions or 
tendencies. Just as the original continuum of nullity is an “indefinite potentiality” that must 
“contract” to produce definite potentialities (the “world of forms”) lest it be a “do nothing 
potentiality”155, likewise, if among the resultant definite possibilities are dispositional properties, then 
in order to be real tendencies, they must also be such as to get themselves realized in actual instances.  
 
 Peirce nearly says as much in several passages including: 
 
 Permit me further to say that I object to having my metaphysical system as a whole 
called Tychism. For although tychism does enter into it, it only enters as a subsidiary to that 
which is really, as I regard it, the characteristic of my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist 
upon continuity, or Thirdness...and that Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute 
reaction, are other elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have anything upon 
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And, 
 
 [The reader] might discern that the theory of those cosmological articles [i.e.“The 
Logic of Continuity” and “The Origin of the Universe”] made reality to consist in something 
more than feeling and action could supply, inasmuch as the primeval chaos, where those two 
elements were present was explicitly shown to be pure nothing...the third category of 
thought, representation, triadic relation, mediation, genuine thirdness, thirdness as such--is 
an essential ingredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute reality, since this category 
(which in that cosmology appears as the element of habit) can have no concrete being without 




[A] law of nature left to itself would be quite analogous to a court without a sheriff...its law 
might be the perfection of human reason but would remain mere fireworks, brutum fulmen.158 
 
And finally,  
 
 There are certain ideas which have a character which our reason can in some 
measure appreciate but which it by no means creates, which character insures their sooner or 
later getting realized...the laws of nature have, I suppose, been brought about in some way; 
and if so, it would seem that they were of such a nature as inevitably to realize themselves.159 
  
 Paul Forster, when analyzing Peirce’s cosmology, suggests that Peirce thought a teleological 
account of the laws of nature is required to explain how the laws, regularities, and habits can come 
about in the first place. As Forster sees it, Peirce thought that the nothingness preceding the 
universe had a tendency for habit-taking as one of its possible differentiations, this tendency (the 
Law of Habit) being necessary for the world to be understandable at all to us. Accordingly, this 
tendency, since it is itself a real potentiality, logically requires chance occurrences of events in order 
                                                
157




 EP2, 72 
  79 
to play itself out.160 Likewise, I suggest that all tendencies, not merely the Law of Habit, must be 
such as to require subjects over which they can range--that is, Firstness and Secondness are logically 
required if we are to take the notion of habits seriously the way Peirce does, as real potentialities.  
 
 That Peirce thought of final causation as a primary component of his philosophical system 
cannot be denied, whatever the case. He says, for example, that (by the principle of synechism), “all 
phenomena are of one character, though some are more mental and spontaneous, others more 
material and regular. Still, all alike present that mixture of freedom and constraint, which allows 
them to be, nay, makes them to be teleological or purposive.”161 Furthermore, in the Collected 
Papers, under the section “A Detailed Classification of the Sciences,” Peirce goes on at length about 
the power of general ideas to get themselves represented in the world by actual objects. They have, 
“a power of finding or creating their vehicles.”162 He says moreover: 
 
 If you ask what mode of being is supposed to belong to an idea that is in no mind, 
the reply will come that undoubtedly the idea must be embodied...in order to attain complete 
being, and that if, at any moment, it should happen that an idea...was quite unconceived by 
any living being, then its mode of being...would consist precisely in this, namely, that it was 
about to receive embodiment...and to work in the world. This would be a mere potential 
being, a being in futuro ;”163 
 
And a few lines later, 
 
 [E]very idea has in some measure...the power to work out physical and psychical 
results. They have life, generative life.164 
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 Peirce goes on to describe that what he means when he says that an idea can confer 
existence on things is that it gives them the power to “work out results in the world”. In 
contradistinction, regular efficient causation, while useful for understanding how a thing works, 
cannot give “life” to things.  
 
 [T]he real life of them, depends upon the idea of them, which simply finds its 
opportunity in those circumstances that are enumerated in the definition [what efficient 
causation reveals]. Efficient causation is that kind of causation whereby the parts compose 
the whole; final causation is that kind of causation whereby the whole calls out its parts. 
Final causation without efficient causation is helpless; mere calling for parts is what a 
Hotspur, or any man, may do; but they will not come without efficient causation. Efficient 
causation without final causation, however, is worse than helpless, by far; it is mere chaos; 
and chaos is not even so much as chaos, without final causation; it is blank nothing.165 
 
 A couple of points about this passage are worth pausing over. First, it should be clear that 
Peirce takes the idea of final causation, or teleological cause, very seriously. Second, this passage 
seems to suggest that even the state of chaos prior to the universe, despite being without any 
regularity and consequently totally indeterminate, still possessed a kind of teleological power. This is 
further evidenced by the fact that in “Man’s Glassy Essence” Peirce says, “[The] primeval chaos in 
which there was no regularity was mere nothing, from a physical aspect. Yet it was not a blank zero.”166 
What this suggests, to me at least, is that Peirce thought the state of nullity (or chaos, depending on 
where one starts) was itself a kind of absolutely general tendency for things. It was, perhaps, a pure 
“being in futuro”. It is a state that is not quite real (because it is irregular and prior to reactions and 
determinate qualities) but it nevertheless had a mode of being. This is maybe why Peirce says that 
the state of nothingness just is pure being and also why he says that in that state there was no lack of 
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potential being.167 I submit that “potential being” just is the very “being in futuro” that Peirce 
characterizes as a dispositional final cause.  
 
 This last point seems to beg the question. How is Peirce to explain the emergence of law and 
regularity--such regularities as habits--if the original state of nullity is just itself pure being in futuro, 
and so characterized as being itself a tendency or habit? Moreover, there is a worry that, if 
tendencies are just statistical regularities that would result after an indefinite length of time, that this 
is meaningless for the early universe, since it is far from clear what it could be a uniformity of. A 
couple things can be said here. With respect to the first point, Peirce can (and does) say that this 
initial state of the universe, although general insofar as it contains the potential for absolutely 
everything, is not among the things that requires explanation because it is purely indeterminate. 
While it is a tendency for every other tendency and possibility, there is no sense in which any 
particular tendency or possibility need arise out of it. It is only by the operation of chance that 
anything even could arise, and chance is just the thing Peirce thinks requires no explanation.168 This 
reply draws a subtle distinction between ordinary tendencies and the state of nullity as a tendency, 
which consists in the fact that whereas ordinary tendencies are tendencies of a certain kind, the 
primeval tendency (to give it a fun name) cannot be of a kind at all--it contains the possibility of all 
kinds.169 
 
 As to the second point, a related answer is possible. It is compatible for the primeval 
tendency to consist in a future statistical uniformity while at the same time holding that this 
uniformity is as yet undetermined with respect to what kinds of objects will be its instances. That is 




 See Peirce’s reply to Carus in Appendix A of CP volume six.  
169
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just to say that some statistical uniformity is possible. If no statistical uniformity were possible, 
Peirce would likely say that the world could not be rational at all, since even a world that is as 
“chancy” as a world could get would still obey the laws of chance, i.e. the Law of Large Numbers, 
since this is a formal law170.  
 
 This last point brings us to (3) above. I have said there that Peirce understands the Law of 
Large Numbers to be a purely formal law and also that the role of the Law of Large Numbers in 
Peirce’s philosophical architectonic is to explain and make understandable tendencies in the world.   
 
This first half of this is relatively straightforward. Peirce devotes an entire section of a lecture 
from 1866 to the notion that there are laws of chance and that they are “the formal conditions of all 
knowledge”.171 In this lecture, Peirce outlines what it means for nature to be uniform, and he says 
that one way of understanding this is to suppose that if we were to take a sample a certain class of 
objects of having some character, it will generally be the case that the whole class has that same 
character.172 But, Peirce goes on, we may wonder if this same sort of thing would apply in a world of 
chance. He says that such occurrences would be rare where that principle would apply. Presumably 
what he means here by a world of chance is that of a purely chaotic state of things with no regularity 
whatsoever. Of course, that is not the world that we live in, and Peirce goes on to note that “chance is 
not the abrogation of all laws,” since it is possible to show that there are “some very curious laws” 
relating to the throwing of a die--a chance affair.173 It seems he can have none other than the Law of 
Large Numbers in mind here.  
 
                                                
170




 Notice that this is just a statement of the Law of Large Numbers. 
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 Peirce notes subsequently that there is a difference between two different kinds of laws: 
formal and material. And formal laws “do not depend on any particular state of things,”174 so that 
they would hold true no matter what our experiences were, but to discover material laws would 
require discovering “just such facts as we did”. He goes on to say that the law that “as is [a] sample 
so is the whole” is a law that would hold “as long as there were any laws, though only formal ones,” 
and they are such that no matter what the world was like they would apply.175 They are, he says, not 
laws of nature but conditions of knowledge in general.  
 
 It seems that, given this, Peirce thinks he can appeal to a chance indeterminacy in the state 
of nullity or chaos prior to the universe as playing an explanatory role for the evolution of the 
cosmos because (what he calls) absolute chance already obeys certain formal laws, such as the Law 
of Large Numbers. This should not be a problem, however, because the laws of chance are such as 
to apply to any possible world whatsoever--that is, any world that is even capable of being reasoned 
about. Worlds that could not, even in principle, be reasoned about lie outside of the realm of 
cognizability, and to suppose that they even could be real, Peirce would probably say, is just a 
flagrant violation of both the pragmatic maxim and a commitment to the possibility of unintelligible 
realities as brute primitives. 
 
 It is a little bit more difficult to establish that Peirce thought that the role of the Law of 
Large Numbers is to make the nature of tendencies understandable, although some evidence from 
this can be gleaned from what was said above. Since the Law of Large Numbers is a formal law, it 
should not be viewed as some kind of governing relation, in the contemporary sense. It is not as 
though it makes anything happen. Rather, it explains something by being of the form of a hypothetical 
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inference. It says that if there are certain characteristics of a distribution that are independent and 
randomly sampled, then the ratio of the sample mean of characteristics to the distribution mean of 
them approaches unity near infinity. Now, this can be taken in several ways. As stated, it makes no 
commitments as to what the characteristics really are. It is non-committal with respect to either 
epistemology or metaphysics. I think, however, that the reason Peirce was so interested in the Law 
of Large Numbers is because of what it can tell us about distributions themselves. In particular, if 
we desire to know whether some object, or some class of objects, has a certain characteristic in 
general, then if we take a randomized sample of measurements of that object, each measurement 
being independent from the others such that they together form an identical distribution, then we 
can discern with a degree of probability whether or not that object has the sought-after 
characteristic. If we discover, from some sufficiently large sample, that thirty percent of the 
measurements have a character in common, then we conclude that, since the sample mean (of 
measurements) approximates the distribution mean, there is a thirty percent chance that the object 
actually has that characteristic. Or, if it is a collection, we reason that roughly thirty percent of the 
members of the whole collection have that characteristic. Of course, we can never be absolutely sure 
of this, as Peirce notes in several places.176  
 
 There is some question as to the priority of the Law of Large Numbers and the phenomena 
that result as “statistical result” of an application of this law to various phenomena. Is the law really 
making the phenomena behave this way? If so, it cannot be in any sense of efficient causation. If that 
were the case, then there would have to be particular objects being related to each other in a 
mechanical way, and the law would cease to be statistical in nature. The only sense Peirce can give to 
the idea that the Law of Large Numbers makes things to behave a certain way must be in a 
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teleological sense, like what was mentioned above. On the other hand, Peirce might simply appeal to 
the Law of Large Numbers for establishing accurate inductions, as in the previous paragraph. He 
certainly thinks it has its use in the latter case.  
 
 Probably, Peirce makes use of the Law of Large Numbers for both purposes. There is some 
sense (a teleological one) in which the Law of Large Numbers explains the behavior of, say, a gas, 
and this is (perhaps) not merely an epistemological notion. That formal law is something that is 
applicable to any world that is capable of being reasoned about, and it will apply whenever its 
conditions are met. The particles of a gas meet the conditions, and our world is one that is capable 
of being reasoned about.  
 
 When it comes to tendencies and habits, I suggest that Peirce thinks the role of the Law of 
Large Numbers is twofold. First, it makes understandable the nature of the tendency or habit, on the 
assumption that a tendency consists in a statistical uniformity that would result in the long run. That 
is just to say that the nature of the tendency consists in the uniformity that would result (in the long 
run) if its instances were independent from one another and formed an identical distribution. Of 
course, on Peirce’s view, what is possible far outstrips what is or could ever be actual, so no such 
state is ever really attainable. But this does not detract from the “would-be” nature of the tendency. 
 
 Secondly, and more importantly, the Law of Large Numbers makes a tendency knowable, in 
that, were inquiring minds to take random samples (measurements) of some instances of the 
tendency, the Law of Large Numbers reveals the true nature of the tendency. It is not necessary that 
anyone should actually do this in order for the tendency to be what it is, but every tendency must be 
the kind of thing that is knowable in some sense if Peirce is to avoid positing brute incognizable 
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general facts. The Law of Large Numbers makes tendencies and habits reasonable and knowable by 
acting as a formal condition of scientific knowledge (as we saw above).  
 
 With all of this in mind, I now turn to the final point, (4). Once this point has been 
elaborated, it will be possible to draw the four claims together and give a summary of my 
interpretation. Instead of building up to the point, I will start in reverse by restating it and tipping 
my hand right away. Here is my claim (copied from above) : The law of habit, being a tendency, is 
not intended to explain how tendencies themselves either arise or get strengthened. It is intended to 
explain why certain tendencies stick around and others do not. It explains why the world, as a whole, 
is regular. In a certain respect, the Law of Habit just is the Law of Large Numbers applied to the 
various property instantiations in the universe as a whole. 
 
 Note how this is different from what Reynolds and Dearmont say. According to Reynolds, 
the law of habit works to update the transition probabilities between event types conditional on their 
instantiations. In other words, the law of habit, according to him, makes any given tendency increase 
itself over time as that tendency manifests itself. If, for example, there is a probability of Pr(E) = P 
for some event E to occur at time T, Reynolds thinks that the law of habit makes it so that, for some 
time T*, there is an increased probability Pr(E) = P+r of E occurring then, where r is some number.  
That is just to say that P increases over time. As we have seen in chapter two, this is a problem if 
Peirce thinks that the law of habit is a statistical law, since it will violate Bernoulli’s Law of Large 
Numbers’ requirements of independence and identical distribution. Here are the definitions given by 
Reynolds:  
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Independence: and event B is independent from A just in case the probability Pr(A|B) = Pr(B), 
i.e. the probability of A’s occurring does not affect the probability of the occurrence of B.  
 
Identical Distribution: a series of events e1 e2 e3...en is identically distributed just in case there is a 
constant probability Pr = p  of occurring for each ei.
177 
 
 The problem is that if the probability of some ei increases the probability of another event of 
the same type, ei+1, then ei+1 is not independent from ei since Pr(ei+1|ei) does not equal Pr(ei+1) by 
itself. Pr(ei+1 ) is affected by Pr(ei) in such a way that the latter increases the former. Likewise, since 
there is not a constant probability between ei and ei+1, which is obvious from what was just said, the 
condition of identical distribution is also violated.  
 
 This problem results, I maintain, because Reynolds is attempting to use the law of habit to 
explain the wrong kind of phenomenon. Despite some passages that seem to say the contrary (which 
we will look at below), Peirce, I claim, is best understood as appealing to the law of habit not to 
explain how any particular tendency or habit increases its own power over time. Rather, he is 
attempting to explain why we should find ourselves in a universe that contains tendencies or habits 
of a certain kind rather than others. And that is just to say why we should find that the universe is 
chock full of emergent regularities. The law of habit is intended to explain a property of the universe 
as a whole, not of individual tendencies. In a certain sense, as we will see, the law of habit just is the 
statistical upshot of considering what would happen over time to a universe in which various 
tendencies were to arise as chance occurrences. It is, then, fully compatible with the Law of Large 
Numbers.  
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Let’s start by looking at some of the things Peirce says about the law of habit in the first 
place. There are numerous examples to choose from; some of them will seem to be at odds with the 
description I have given above, and so I will try to contend with these difficulties if not as we go 
along then once we are in a good position to evaluate them. 
 
 Peirce says that the law of habit consists in a “tendency to generalization”.178 He furthermore 
says that it is a tendency for all things to take habits and that it can grow by its own virtue.179 What is 
needed is an explanation of how this can be true without falling back on Reynold’s understanding of 
the law. Peirce says that the primordial state of chaos must have contained--since it contained “a 
little of everything conceivable”--a “little undifferentiated tendency to take [habits],”180 and that, 
furthermore, this tendency would have a “growing virtue”.181 How does it grow? Evidently by its 
own accord: “[I]t is clear that nothing but a principle of habit, itself due to the growth by habit of an 
infinitesimal chance tendency toward habit-taking, is the only bridge that can span the chasm 
between the chance-medley of chaos and the cosmos of order and law.”182 And: 
 
 [A] tendency to act in any way, combined with a tendency to take habits, must 
increase the tendency to act in that way. Now substitute in this general statement for 
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And finally in a reply to Dr. Carus (Peirce evidently getting fed up), 
 
 Almost as unthinking is the objection that absolute chance could never beget order. I 
have noticed elsewhere the historical oblivescence to this objection. Must I once again repeat 
that the tendency to take habits, being itself a habit, has eo ipso a tendency to grow; so that 
only the slightest germ is needed? [I] can find no difficulty in the production of that first 
infinitesimal germ of habit-taking by chance, provided [the realist like Peirce] thinks chance 
could act at all. This seems, at first blush, to be explaining something as a chance-result. But 
exact analysis will show it is not so.184 
 
 This last passage has a lot going on that is worth taking a look at. First of all, notice that 
Peirce says that the tendency for habit taking would have started as a “germ” of a tendency. Second, 
he seems to contradict himself here, since he says that the first germ of a tendency itself arose by 
chance, but then he goes on to say that “exact analysis” will show that he is not explaining 
something as a chance-result. I think what he means can be resolved by looking a few paragraphs 
earlier in the same paper. Here, Peirce says that “Everybody is familiar with the fact that chance has 
laws, and that statistical results follow therefrom. Very well: I do not propose to explain anything as 
due to the action of chance, that is, as being lawless.”185 In conjunction with the passage above, this 
suggests that Peirce views the production of the infinitesimal germ of habit-taking, or we might say 
the seed of the law of habit, as a statistical result. In this way, it is still something that is subject to 
the laws of chance, and so is not the result of complete lawlessness, although, as we have seen, 
Peirce does not think this is a problematic or question-begging claim, since the laws of chance are 
purely formal laws from which nothing necessarily results. If this is right, however, we are left to 
wonder what it would mean for a “germ” of habit-taking to come about by chance. Is it merely one 
among the various tendencies that could get differentiated from nullity, or what? While that is a 
plausible reading, given some of the things Peirce says, I will opt for a different interpretation.  
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 The “germ” of the law of habit, I claim, comes about as the statistical upshot of the many 
tendencies or habits that themselves arose as chance differentiations of the continuum. It would be 
better, then, to say that the law of habit began with germs (in the plural) of habits or tendencies. And 
in fact, Peirce does say something like this, in two places that I can find.  
 
 But I only propose to explain the regularities of nature as consequences of the only 
uniformity, or general fact, there was in the chaos, namely, the general absence of any 
determinate law. In fact, after this first step is taken, I only use chance to give room for the 
development of law by means of the law of habits.186 
 
 There are two things to notice here. First, this passage suggests that whatever the law of 
habit is, it is related to chance in an important way, and this I believe will come to support my claim 
that the law of habit is itself a statistical result. Second, I do not think it is a mere coincidence that 
Peirce uses the word “habits” in the plural. Instead, whether deliberate or not, I suspect that what he 
has in mind is that the law of habit (“habits”) is a statistical law that ranges over habits much in the 
way that the gas laws of thermodynamics range over individual molecules. There are other hints that 
this is what is going on, as when Peirce writes to Christine Ladd-Franklin: 
 
 We have on our side of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to 
all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to 
the growth of habit. The tendency to form habits or tendency to generalize, is something 
which grows by its own action, by the habit of taking habits itself growing. Its first germs 
arose from pure chance. There were slight tendencies to obey rules that had been followed, 
and these tendencies were rules which were more and more obeyed by their own action. 
There were also slight tendencies to do otherwise than previously, and these destroyed 
themselves.187 
 
 This is a very revealing passage. Peirce tells Ladd-Franklin that the law of habit is what 
produces conformity to a law, and he hints that this process started with “germs” of tendencies that 
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arose by chance. Note, once again, the plural. This accords well with the interpretation I am 
advancing, according to which tendencies are dispositional properties that emerge from the 
continuum by chance and then together form an overall tendency for order. Additionally, there are 
some places where Peirce says things that sounds suspiciously just like this. He says, for example, in 
“Design and Chance,” that his opinion (on cosmology) is “only Darwinism analyzed, generalized, 
and brought into the realm of Ontology,”188 and when, in “Variety and Uniformity” he says that,  
 
 In so far as evolution follows a law, the law of habit, instead of being a movement 
from homogeneity to heterogeneity, is a growth from difformity to uniformity. But the 
chance divergences from law are perpetually acting to increase the variety of the world, and 
are checked by a sort of natural selection and otherwise...so that the general result may be 
described as ‘organized heterogeneity,’ or, better, rationalized variety.189 
 
 What I think Peirce is suggesting is that chance occurrences bring about instantiations of 
qualities and tendencies and these go together in various ways, some tendencies working against one 
another, some being self destructive, and so forth. Over time, those which are either precluded by 
others or are self-annihilating will tend to get weeded out of the existing universe, so that there is a 
sense in which the more regular tendencies will survive, having been selected for by a kind of cosmic 
natural selection. Moreover, this passage is revealing about the structure of the universe itself. What 
he has in mind, it looks like, is that whereas the action of chance is to diversify the world, the action 
of the law of habit is to increase order, so that the end result will be a world of a wide variety of 
differing systems at multiple levels.190 
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 Recall Peirce’s metaphor of the blackboard. In 6.207 he says, “Many such reacting systems may 
spring up on the original continuum; and each of these may itself act as a first line from which a larger 
system may be built, in which it in turn will merge its individuality.” 
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 Peirce does go on to say, in a number of places, that tendencies that are self-destructive will 
end up getting eliminated from the universe. As we saw above, in his letter to Ladd-Franklin, he says 
that some tendencies would destroy themselves if they had a tendency to do otherwise than on 
former occasions. In another passage he elaborates this thought: 
 
 But there are some habits that carried beyond a certain point eliminate their subjects 
from the universe. There are many ways in which this might happen. Thus a tendency to lose 
mass will end in a total loss of mass. A tendency to lose energy will end in removing its 
subject from perceptible existence. A tendency to gain energy will end in the body’s shooting 
through the universe too rapidly to produce any effect, etc.191 
 
And likewise in “A Guess at the Riddle,” Peirce says that when it comes to the evolution of 
substances, they come about because pairs of states (Peirce is here referring to states as the “flashes” 
of Secondness mentioned in an earlier section) take habits, and these habits will tend to bundle 
together. Some of them will have a tendency for persistency, he says, and so will stick around, while 
those that do not have this tendency will “fall out of existence”.192 Over time, substances, i.e. 
bundles of habits, will become permanent because of this.  
 
Let’s pause for a minute here in order to see what is going on. I have claimed that the law of 
habit is a statistical law, not merely in the sense that it can be understood statistically, since any 
tendency will be like that, but in the sense that it is analogous to the gas laws of thermodynamics. 
Just as a gas released into an empty container has a tendency to achieve equilibrium, such tendency 
being understandable in terms of the chance behavior of many different molecules, so the law of 
habit is a tendency for regularity and order in the universe, which is the statistical result of the 
chance arising of various tendencies or dispositional properties. Since some of those properties will 





  93 
be such as to eliminate themselves, there is a general discernable trend toward regularity on the 
whole (but it will be a regularity of various systems, or as Peirce says, an “organized heterogeneity”). 
To support this claim, I have, so far, pointed to some places where Peirce talks about how the law of 
habit begins as a “germ” of habit taking. We have seen further that there is some reason to think 
that Peirce did not think the law of habit begins as a single germ but was the result of early 
combinations of chance tendencies for regularity. I then pointed to some passages where Peirce talks 
about these tendencies and why some would stick around and some would not. There are two things 
that I have yet to show, although I think what has been shown above already implies them. First, we 
need a good reason to believe that Peirce actually thought the laws of nature evolved by this process 
according to which certain dispositions stick around and others are lost. If that is shown, then since 
we have already seen that Peirce thinks the laws of nature come about because of the law of habit, this 
process must just be the law of habit in operation. Second, there must be some sense in which this 
process is a statistical one, and it would be nice to see Peirce say so. I believe I can show textual 
evidence for  both of these claims. I will not, however, address the claims separately, because while 
they are distinct, the textual evidence for them overlaps considerably. 
 
Peirce’s manuscript “Design and Chance” turns out to be particularly helpful here. Peirce 
gives an account as to how chance events can combine together to produce various uniformities, 
such as when gamblers play games involving dice. He notes that if there are variations in the dice, 
for example, then just by chance, that is in the long run of chance occurrences acting in conjunction 
with the individual die, certain separations of players will result. This is because the dice might, for 
example, become worn down over time on certain edges, leading to an increased probability for 
certain outcomes. Even though the throw of each die is independent from the others, there will still 
arise non-uniform siftings of various outcomes, “If these effects were to be alternated after billions 
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of trials, the effect would be to make numbers of distinct classes of players.”193 This is just the sort 
of action of chance that will produce heterogeneity from an initially homogeneous set of events. The 
reason Peirce brings this up is in order to talk about the laws of nature and how they come about. 
He notes that “Certain laws of nature...are known to be the results of chance--statistical facts so to 
say,” and he goes on to say that, “I cannot help but believe that more of the molecular laws...will be 
found to involve the same element.”194 Moreover, a statistical law only works because there exist 
underlying regularities to the objects over which it ranges, and yet it is, according to Peirce, “able to 
produce uniformities far more strict than those from which it works.”195 Immediately after this, 
Peirce says that it is plausible that all the other laws of nature are statistical results of this sort.196 
 
After all this, Peirce goes on to say, “I have several times shown to my classes [presumably at 
Johns Hopkins, where the lecture based on this manuscript was given] how some of the main laws 
of cerebration and particularly the formation of habits could be accounted for by the principles of 
probability.”197 This is revealing, although it doesn’t quite get what we need, since we would have to 
establish that the method by which habits come about involves something like the natural selection 
process applied to dispositional properties or tendencies. But just a few lines after this, Peirce goes 
on to say (quoting at some length): 
 
For every kind of an organism, system, form, or compound, there is an absolute limit 
to a weakening process. It ends in destruction; there is no limit to strength. The result is that 
chance in its action tends to destroy the weak & increase the average strength of the objects 
remaining. Systems or compounds which have bad habits are quickly destroyed, those which 
have no habits follow the same course; only those which have good habits tend to survive.  
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May not the laws of physics be habits gradually acquired by systems[?] Why, for 
instance, do the heavenly bodies tend to attract one another? Because in the long run bodies 
that repel or do not attract will get thrown out of the region of space leaving only the 
mutually attracting bodies. Why do they attract inversely as the square of the distance? This 
may be only their average law of attraction;”198 
 
This is probably as close to a smoking gun as we are going to get in terms of Peirce telling us 
how it is that “inveterate habits [are] becoming physical laws”199 in a way that accords directly with 
the interpretation of the law of habit I have been trying to advance. Here, it is clear that several 
things are going on. In the first place, Peirce is trying to explain how it is that the laws of nature 
develop by the action of chance. But additionally, he gives us the two things we want--that this 
process is evolutionary, which works by infelicitous habits (or tendencies) eliminating themselves 
and each other and also that the laws of nature that result from this are the statistical result of this 
process; they are the averages that obtain given what tendencies are left after “bad habits” are 
eliminated.  
 
Since Peirce thinks that the laws of nature evolve because of the law of habit, it is difficult 
not to identify this process with the law of habit itself. The law of habit is itself a tendency, but, I 
claim, it is not a tendency that pops into existence as a single First quality. It is, rather, like the 
tendencies involved in statistical thermodynamics. It is a statistical result of the average of other 
tendencies in the universe. This is perhaps why Peirce says in “Variety and Uniformity” that, “on the 
other hand the law of habit is a simple formal law.”200 What he probably means here, if my 
interpretation is correct,  is that the law of of habit just is the result of applying the Law of Large 
Numbers to the vast number of tendencies or dispositional properties in nature.  
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If the above points are correct, then it seems there is good reason to believe that the law of 
habit is not intended to explain how any particular tendency strengthens itself over time. It is, rather, 
intended to explain how the universe has a whole is tending toward an increase in various “systems” 
of habits due to the statistical uniformity that would arise in the long run of stable 
dispositions/tendencies/habits sticking around and unstable ones “falling out of existence” (i.e. out 
of relation to other reactive systems). It is true, in some sense, that the law of habit increases itself, 
but this is not by virtue of some mysterious self-action, although Peirce often cryptically refers to it 
that way. It is, rather, just what the law consists in statistically. It will increase itself in the sense that 
it is sure to be the case, statistically speaking, that as time goes on there will be more and more 
regular systems and fewer and fewer “bad habits”.  
 
A metaphor can help here. It is a slightly odd or implausible one, as thought experiments 
usually are, but it will help visualize the process, I think. We can imagine tendencies or dispositional 
properties to be like bees flying in more or less erratic patterns. For our thought experiment, we will 
want an infinite number of bees, although we don’t have to have them all at the same time. Let’s not 
worry about how they come about--we’ll suppose them to pop into existence quite randomly. Each 
bee is independent of the next, and there is nothing about any one bee that makes any other bee 
more or less likely. All have their existence by chance. Furthermore, every bee has its own erratic 
pattern of behavior, though some will be more or less similar. On any given occasion, which 
direction a certain bee flies is a random chance affair, although no bee will fly outside of the range of 
its pattern of behavior. To even call it a “pattern” is misleading--all I mean is that some bees will tend 
to fly in regular concentric circles, some will tend to fly in a zig-zag, some will tend to cover a large 
area, some will not, etc. Now, imagine that the bees are flying down a tunnel, indefinitely long. And 
we will imagine that the interior of the tunnel is electrified, or in some other way would produce the 
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death of any given bee were it to encounter it by chance. What will happen to the whole collection 
of bees as time goes on? It is not difficult to see that the bees that have more or less regular 
tendencies to fly nearer the center will survive in a greater proportion than those that don’t; this is 
even true if bees are coming into existence at random, since the kinds of tendencies they will 
exemplify will also be just as random. Over the very long run, a statistical tendency would play itself 
out, that bees with regular behaviors to stay near the center would be, mostly, the only bees around. 
If we were to add other factors into the mix, say that some bees, upon collision, would destroy each 
other whereas others would not, this universe of bees would become further differentiated into 
systems of bees, each of which is likely to be found nearer the center than otherwise, but which are 
likely to avoid each other. This is akin to Peirce’s idea of organized heterogeneity. By chance, those 
tendencies will arise over time, so that the whole universe is at the same time growing and becoming 
more uniform, each system becoming increasingly uniform as well until new systems are grown or 
differentiated out of them. Moreover, these systems themselves can act in unison, and so regularly, 
to be combined with other systems to form new statistical regularities, which will be new objects 
with their own tendencies. We could say that there is a general tendency for tendencies, or that the 
law of habit is operative here, because chance combined with tendencies is going to produce further 
tendencies or systems of habitual behavior. But it is not as though the universal tendency for 
tendencies is somehow strengthening the individual tendency of any given insect. Those tendencies 
are increased only by finding themselves in greater proportion relative to the whole, much in the 
same way that Peirce thinks the law of attraction between heavenly bodies (we can only assume he 
has gravity in mind) is strengthened over time as the result of the dispositions of the bodies 
themselves interacting and coming to converge statistically on a single value.  
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There are some natural limitations to the metaphor. In the first place, there is no container 
for the universe to act as the tunnel, but this is unimportant, as can easily be seen once we take note 
of the fact that the chance interactions between various tendencies, which would destroy them, will 
affect the same change in the overall system. There is also some question as to the natures of the 
tendencies themselves. In the metaphor they are bees, so they are already complex existences. Are 
the habits of nature also complex? Just as above, it is open to Peirce to say that even these complex 
habits consist in statistical regularities of uniformities undergirding them, and these consist in habits 
that are themselves statistical regularities of uniformities undergirding them, and so on. This will 
naturally lead to an infinite regress, but Peirce has no problem with this. He says exactly this in fact: 
 
It is therefore possible to suppose that not only the laws of chemistry but other 
known laws of matter are statistical results. Thomson supposes matter to consist of eddies in 
fluid.201 If a fluid is composed again of molecules its laws will be mainly due to chance. Now 
I will suppose that all known laws are due to chance and repose upon others far less rigid 
themselves due to chance and so on in an infinite regress, the further we go back the more 
indefinite being the nature of the laws, and in this way we see the possibility of an indefinite 
approximation toward a complete explanation of nature.202 
 
The oddity of this can perhaps be quelled a bit by noting that this infinite regress would only 
extend infinitely back in time, but not necessarily into the state of nullity itself out of which time is 
supposed to have arisen. At any rate, one might wonder if there is any place where this process 
“grounds out” (to use a contemporary phrase). Peirce does give a little hint at this. He says that, 
because the statistical uniformities that arise by the operations of chance are due to fortuitous 
distributions, which require “some uniformity of the objects of the collection”203 of which there is a 
statistical uniformity, that “Law begets law; and chance begets chance.”204 Peirce knows that this is a 
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problematic thing to say given his synechism and commitment to avoiding brute regularities. He 
immediately notes that in order to escape the duality, we must suppose that “the first germ of law 
was an entity, which itself arose by chance, that is as a First.”205 
 
What this suggests to me, if we take Peirce to really mean “germs” (the plural), is that while 
the laws of nature and habits, as statistical uniformities, that form the existing universe depend upon 
statistical uniformities of further habits--statistical uniformities all the way down, as it were--for as 
far back and time as we could ever wish to investigate, the principle of abduction requires that we 
make sense of the universe prior to time, in the state of chaos or nullity. Here, it seems, Peirce wants 
to say that there are irreducible tendencies that arise as Firsts. But this is just to say what I have 
suggested above, that among the qualities that initially get differentiated from the continuum are 
certain dispositional properties.  
 
II .  Cosmology redux in l ight  o f  the interpretat ion 
 
With the above interpretation, we can take a quick look at how all the pieces of the 
cosmology fit together on that view. Here is an overview of the whole picture, given the 
interpretation above and starting with the state of nullity.  
 
The universe begins in a state of total nothingness that is not merely a “blank zero” but a 
state of real potentiality. We have seen that Peirce has some kind of notion of final causation built 
into even this state, but it is not any kind of brute regularity, and so it does not violate his principles 
of inquiry. The universe in this state is prior to any differentiation or determination. It is much like 
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the possibility of all possible worlds and of all possible qualities. From this state is differentiated a 
continuum of qualities or firsts, among which are certain dispositional properties, or what Peirce 
calls tendencies. These are also real potentialities. This continuum Peirce calls the “world of forms”. 
In order to to be such as to be capable of getting realized, which they must be if they are to be real 
potentialities and not mere logical possibilities, there must arise chance reactions between them. 
These instantiations of qualities are existing “flashes” of existence, but without any regularity. For 
dispositional properties, there must arise chance reactions of qualities disposed to go together in 
certain ways. Among such dispositional properties must be dispositions for various kinds of 
regularity (these are, after all, possible ways a disposition could be). We can imagine that there were 
tendencies for the property of redness and circularity to go together, for example. There might be 
tendencies for redness and circularity to go together on increasingly frequent occasions, tendencies 
for redness and circularity to go together on decreasingly frequent occasions, and so forth. These 
latter ones would fall out of existence over time (they would, in a sense, be subsumed back into the 
continuum of possible qualities). Those which were regular would tend to stick around. The 
statistical upshot of such behavior defines the law of habit, which is itself just a general tendency for 
the universe, as a whole, to differentiate itself into increasingly regular determinations of its 
tendencies. Such regular tendencies themselves will go together to form further tendencies by acting 
as the kinds of uniformities that the “laws of chance” (i.e. Bernoulli’s Law of Large Numbers, for 
example) applies to. So substances will be formed as bundles of habits and qualities. Likewise, there 
will be relations between substances which will go together on average to constitute general laws of 
nature. Because the underlying uniformities of the various substances in the universe are statistical 
and inexact, so the laws of nature will be inexact. But they will be growing all the time toward central 
values because there is a general trend in the universe (the law of habit) for those tendencies that are 
not regular to get destroyed and for regular tendencies to get selected for (a kind of cosmic natural 
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selection). In the very end of things, if there ever were an end (which Peirce thinks there never 
actually will be), the laws of nature would be perfectly exact and, as he says, crystallized.  
 
III .  The Law of  Large Numbers and The Incompatibi l i ty  Problem Revis i t ed 
 
I have already suggested above what the solution to the incompatibility problem will look 
like on this perspective, but it is worth getting clear about here. The incompatibility problem arises 
in the first place because Reynolds characterizes the law of habit as being something that increases 
the power of any given tendency, including itself. But if my interpretation is correct, this is a mistake. 
It is a misapplication of the law, because it is trying to use it to explain the wrong thing. If it were the 
case that the law of habit were intended to explain how tendencies could strengthen themselves over 
time, then it would indeed be incompatible with the Law of Large Numbers. This is because, as we 
have seen, instances of any given tendency would no longer be independent from one another, its 
being more probable on a subsequent occasion that a tendency would act in some way than on a 
former one. Furthermore, since the probability of acting in any given way would be increasing over 
time, the requirement of Bernoulli’s Law of Large Numbers that the events in a distribution (where 
this is the instantiations of the tendency in question) would not form an identical distribution--there 
would not be a constant probability between events.  
 
However, if the law of habit is instead intended to explain why the universe as a whole 
would come to have regularities and order--that is, how it would become an “organized 
heterogeneity”--then we can see that the Law of Large Numbers is not violated here. In some ways, 
we could view the law of habit just as the Law of Large Numbers applying to all the various kinds of 
tendencies, or dispositional properties, that the universe contains. There is some sense, it is true, to 
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the idea that the law will strengthen itself over time, but this is nothing special. It is just to say that, 
as the Law of Large Numbers would lead us to predict, a statistical uniformity will arise out of the 
chance instantiations of various elements, each of which is independent from the others and some 
of which are going to get eliminated. That is no different than the way in which the Law of Large 
Numbers applies to ordinary cases of evolution such as speciation.  
 
On the interpretation above, each dispositional property in the universe is selected out of the 
continuum--differentiated--by chance. There is no special reason why the universe starts with the 
tendencies that it does. The selecting of one tendency does not affect the selecting of another. 
Chance is a basic “ingredient” of the universe. Likewise, there is a constant probability of finding 
any given tendency (for the same reason: all of them come about spontaneously). Yet, once they 
arise and begin to interact, there will emerge an overall pattern, a tendency for those which don’t 
eliminate themselves from existence to stick around. That is the law of habit, and it is just an 
application of the Law of Large Numbers. From there on, anywhere there are statistical uniformities, 
there are possible chance interactions between those uniformities, which can bring about further 
uniformities. That is the sense in which the law of habit spreads throughout the universe; but this 
spreading should not be thought of as starting in some specific place and moving outward. It is 
more like a spreading “into”. It will first only have very basic phenomena to apply to, but over time 
those will combine to make up more complex phenomena to which it will continue to apply.  
 
There is one objection that I think should be addressed, since it looks like it could be a 
problem for my account generally, or perhaps for any account that tries to solve the incompatibility 
problem. The incompatibility problem arises because there is supposed to be a contradiction in 
analyzing the evolution of laws and regularities by means of the Law of Large Numbers--with its 
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requirements for independence of events and identical distribution--and the Law of Habit, which seems 
to suggest that the transition probabilities between event types get updated and so involves the 
events being connected. First of all, I will note that Reynolds is, I think, simply mistaken that the Law 
of Large Number requires an identical distribution of events. That is not exactly accurate as far as I 
understand the mathematics. An identical distribution that results from an application of the Law of 
Large Numbers is a feature of the randomization process. If the selection of samples is fair and 
random, then an identical distribution will be formed among the samples, such that, if we were 
measuring some variable, the probability distribution over the samples would form a normal bell 
curve. If the underlying distribution of events in the population are randomly distributed, then we 
would expect a normal curve. If they are not, we would discover that they are not, because the 
distribution of our samples would not be “normal” or identically distributed. That method is how 
physicists discover new fundamental particles, for example. Or, what is basically the same idea, if we 
measure a phenomenon, then measurements of the aberrancy from the mean value of the 
phenomenon in question will form a normal bell curve, provided we take samples randomly. For the 
Law of Large Numbers to tell us something, we have to take the samples randomly, but it doesn’t 
follow that the underlying phenomenon has to be totally random itself!  
 
Moreover, the requirement of independence is not, I think, going to be a problem for the 
Law of Large Numbers applying to the properties of the universe as a whole taken together. To see 
this, consider an analogy between all the properties in the universe and the molecules of a gas. Surely 
Reynolds would not want to say that the Law of Large Numbers doesn’t explain how a gas evolves 
in a container. The reason we can apply the Law of Large Numbers to the particles of a gas and 
discover a tendency toward equilibrium is because the gas particles are independent of one another 
and highly random in their behavior. It does not follow, however, that the states of the system are 
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independent from one another in the statistical sense, nor does it follow that there is a constant 
probability between state types. It is true that this is the case once the gas has already reached 
equilibrium.206 But the question under consideration is whether the states of the gas over time are 
independent from one another while they are evolving toward equilibrium. They obviously are not, 
since if they were, it would be equally likely that, once released into the container, the gas would 
evolve backwards. Essentially, the process of evolution takes place because the possible ways the gas 
could evolve is getting delimited over time; there are increasingly fewer ways for the gas to go 
backwards.  
 
On my account, the various property instantiations found in the universe are like the 
molecules of a gas. They are statistically independent from one another, and it is because of this that 
a statistical result is produced, thereby explaining their tendency and evolution toward an end. Once 
they reach certain states (analogous to equilibrium--although they are always getting a little more 
precise), they can combine together to produce even more tendencies. On Peirce’s account, 
everything in the universe is continuous, a feature of his synechism. Accordingly, even a gas 
molecule is really itself a statistical upshot of various property instantiations. As long as that 
statistical upshot is independent of other ones (the other gas molecules)--which, since the universe 
starts out chaotically, it will be--those systems can play off one another to produce novel 
uniformities, some eliminating others and so on. There is no problem about the Law of Large 
Numbers being in contradiction to the Law of Habit, because the Law of Habit is just a convenient 
name Peirce gives to the general fact that the Law of Large Numbers combined with various 
dispositional property instantiations will result in the “spreading” of statistical uniformities. Much 
like the states of a gas, the states of a law of nature are not independent of one another, although the 
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underlying regularities themselves are. If the reader is still worried about this, because it seems to 
imply the possibility of an infinite regress, all I can say here is that Peirce is only concerned that 
everything that requires an explanation get one, and he already rejects foundationalism, so an infinite 
regress here will probably not be vicious according to him. Reality will get vaguer and vaguer, more 
wild, more chaotic the further “down” the chain of being we descend. It will bottom out only at an 
ideal point in the infinite past.  
 
Lastly, if it is not already obvious from what has been said, this interpretation solves 
Reynolds’ other problem about uniformities. Recall how Reynolds objects that in order for the Law 
of Large Numbers to work on a coin toss or the throwing of dice, there have to already be 
regularities present in either the coin or the dice. If the dice were to suddenly change their behaviors, 
the Law of Large Numbers would not even be a possible application of mathematics to the  physical 
world. This is quite right. Fortunately, Peirce is well aware of this, and that is basically the point of 
two pages devoted to (apparently) this very problem in “Causation and Force”.207 This is solved by 
the fact that Peirce is willing to accept that in the early stages of cosmic evolution this very thing 
probably did happen all the time. That is, the properties of any given object, provided there even 
were objects in a  physical sense, would have been switching out all the time for other ones. The 
result of this is just that the object itself only consists in those properties that do have the tendency 
to stick around. Over time, since things with tendencies to behave irregularly would go out of 
existence, all that would be left would be things with regular behaviors. That is not to say that they 
would be perfectly regular, but Peirce can (and does) just say that the departures from regularity are 
small enough that we cannot notice them. Compare: if the mass of a single electron on a die were to 
suddenly change, would it really affect the statistical distribution that would be formed by rolling 
                                                
207
 RLT 210-211 
  106 
that die? It obviously would not, and this is because the properties that the die has on a macro-level 
are themselves statistical results of the atoms making up the die taken together. The other properties 
would, on the whole, balance this aberrancy out. In the early universe these departures may have 
been frequent, but they would eventually eliminate themselves to the point that the probability of 
any departure from observable regularities would be miniscule. Interestingly, some modification of 
this idea can probably be used to solve an outstanding problem in the contemporary metaphysics 
literature on dispositional laws of nature called “the problem of retention”.208 But an analysis of 
contemporary dispositional accounts of lawhood involving Peircean intuitions has its being in futuro. 
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